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Abstract
Face recognition is a mature and reliable technology for identifying people. Due
to high-definition cameras and supporting devices, it is considered the fastest and
the least intrusive biometric recognition modality. Nevertheless, effective spoofing
attempts on face recognition systems were found to be possible. As a result, vari-
ous anti-spoofing algorithms were developed to counteract these attacks. They are
commonly referred in the literature a liveness detection tests. In this research we
highlight the effectiveness of some simple, direct spoofing attacks, and test one of
the current robust liveness detection algorithms, i.e. the logistic regression based
face liveness detection from a single image, proposed by the Tan et al. [177], against
malicious attacks using processed imposter images. In particular, we study experi-
mentally the effect of common image processing operations such as sharpening and
smoothing, as well as corruption with salt and pepper noise, on the face liveness
detection algorithm, and we find that it is especially vulnerable against spoofing
attempts using processed imposter images. We design and present a new facial
database, the Durham Face Database, which is the first, to the best of our knowl-
edge, to have client, imposter as well as processed imposter images. Finally, we
evaluate our claim on the effectiveness of proposed imposter image attacks using
transfer learning on Convolutional Neural Networks. We verify that such attacks
are more difficult to detect even when using high-end, expensive machine learning
techniques.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Biometrics based user verification systems rely on the extraction of some human
biological characteristics and their statistical analysis to verify the identity of a
person. Biometric Security is a relatively new technology which has seen its usage
rapidly in the last few decades. It can compete against the more traditional methods
such as pins and passwords. which can be easily guessed, or forgotten, leaving the
person to struggle with no access to the system [50,81].
A biometric characteristic is any extracted measurable distinguishing character-
istic of an individual used for the purpose of biometric identification. Biometric
characteristics are classified into two main categories; physiological and behavioural
biometrics. Physiological biometrics are based on human body part measurements
and prominent examples include fingerprint, face and iris recognition. Meanwhile,
behavioural biometrics are those based on human action measurements and promi-
nent examples include gesture, key stroking, gait and signature recognition [16,50].
For any of these characteristics to be qualified as a biometric, it should satisfy the
following requirements:
 Universality: where each individual should have the determined characteristic.
 Distinctiveness: no two individuals must have the same characteristic.
 Permanence: the characteristic should be permanent and invariant over a
duration of time.
1
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 Collectability: there should be a quantitative measurement for the character-
istic.
Moreover, practical biometric systems should also consider the following issues:
 Performance: resources require both intended recognition beside the opera-
tional and environmental factors to achieve the desired accuracy and speed.
 Acceptability: users are willing to accept the use of biometric identifier in their
daily lives.
 and Circumvention: indicates the easiness or difficulty of fraudulent attempts
on the system.
Among various physiological biometric methods, face recognition has recently
received attention from both industrial and academic fields [209]. Currently, face
recognition is one of the most widely used authentication methods based on biomet-
rics. It is considered as a mature technology which offers a fast, reliable, convenient
and inexpensive way for person identification and has already found a wide range
of applications, from security critical applications such as passport control at the
gates of an airport, to consumer level applications, such as automatically logging
into a laptop or smartphone. The developed techniques vary in sophistication, as
well as in hardware and software requirements, ranging from systems based on 3D
face scans, through systems based on videos, to systems that can work with a single
still image [143]. In contrast to the fingerprint and iris recognition which use high
resolution images, face recognition has the unique characteristic of being based on
data that can well be found in the public domain. Regarding performance and ac-
ceptability, it is a prime candidate technique in biometric identification applications
requiring real-time, reliable and unobtrusive user authentication without the use of
specialized hardware.
Regarding circumvention, face recognition is considered vulnerable to spoofing
attacks. This vulnerability means that user authentication through face recognition
is still mostly confined to either applications with low security requirements, or
applications in highly controlled environments.
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Figure 1.1: Biomteric Modalities; Physiological and Behavioural biometric methods.
Enhancing the security of face recognition systems is a major challenge since
a secure system should be able to withstand a variety of attacks, ranging from
systematic algorithmic attacks to attacks based on theft of data. In one of the
simplest spoofing attacks on a face recognition system, the relatively easy access to
face image data of the average person, allows a spoof attack by printing on paper
the photo of the rightful user of the face recognition system and hold it in front of
the camera to gain access to the system. These photos can be easily obtained either
by doing a quick on-line search or by logging into a social network and downloading
photos or videos they have posted on these sites and hold them in front of the
camera. This means that face recognition is particularly vulnerable to spoofing
attacks.
As a result, the use of face recognition is restricted to either applications where
security is considered secondary to convenience, e.g. log in to a personal devices, or
to applications in tightly controlled environments, such as issuing national ID cards,
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where the behaviour of authentication systems is closely observed. When either
of these two conditions are not met, e.g. money withdrawals from a street ATM
machine, face recognition is not deemed a suitable person authentication method.
As a response to such vulnerabilities, the development of anti-spoofing algo-
rithms and techniques, commonly called liveness tests, has become a very active
research area. Liveness tests are binary classification algorithms aiming at deter-
mining whether the recognised face is a live face, or for example, a photo or video
played in front of the systems camera by an attacker.
The performance of anti-spoofing algorithms is evaluated on databases contain-
ing both photos of real people called client images, and spoofing photos, which
essentially are photos of client images and are called imposter images. The design
of such a database is a particularly challenging task given the multiple sources of
variation in spoofing attacks. Indeed, a whole range of choices, from the choice
between a paper photo or an electronic display for the attack, to the type of paper
and printer used to print a photo, to the size of that photo and the way it is held in
front of the camera, all these factors can impact the effectiveness of the attack and
thus the perceived performance of the anti-spoofing algorithm.
1.1 Motivation
Over the years, a large number of face anti-spoofing algorithms have been developed.
The variety of these approaches and the research interest in the area, motivated us
to assess some of the anti-spoofing algorithms against attacks.
Due to the numerous potential face spoofing attacks, we decided to first evaluate
the resilience of some well-known face recognition systems against a pre-designed,
direct and simple attack. The aim was to emphasise the easiness of spoofing some
widely available face recognition systems. Our experiment showed that some of
these widely used applications are strongly vulnerable against various types of direct
spoofing attempts, see Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 tested hardware and software systems rather than algorithms. In our
next step we moved from black box testing to white box testing, concentrating on
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some fundamental anti-spoofing techniques.
Tan et al. [177] is a well-known, robust face liveness detection technique, see
Section 3.4 for details. It is a relatively simple algorithm and all its components are
based on well-understood techniques. In Chapter 5 we chose to test this algorithm
by processing an imposter image with different image processing techniques and also
applying certain filters to these images, such as the noise addition, sharpening, and
blurring.
In particular, latent samples were constructed using the difference of Gaussian
(DoG), because the Fourier spectrum of the DoG for both client and imposter images
shows that the real image has a richer horizontal components in the high frequency
areas than the imposter image. In Figure 1.2, Tan et al. is visualizing the 2D Fourier
transform of the DoG for both client and imposter images from their pre-collected
NUAA facial spoofing database. In our research, we are studying the robustness of
the Tan et al. proposed face anti-spoofing algorithm using processed imposter images
under various filters. We mostly use three common filters; sharpening, adding salt
and pepper noise, and Gaussian blurring. The aim is to identify the most suitable
filtering technique which increases the horizontal frequency areas of the imposter
image to become more similar to client images, and thus, it makes it more difficult
to distinguish between them.
As an example to our intended work, Figure 1.3 shows the 2D Fourier transforms
of DoG of images taken by us for testing the effectiveness of spoofing attacks and the
result shows differences in the frequencies around the central areas. Figure 1.2 (f)
shows how the horizontal components in the high frequency areas of the sharpened
imposter image became richer.
Our initial investigations highlighted one limitation shared by the majority of the
current approaches to the development of liveness tests, that is, the tacit assumption
that the imposter will use the stolen image or video as it is, i.e., without previously
processing it in order to increase the effectiveness of the attack. Moreover, this
tacit assumption is carried over from the development to the evaluation of liveness
tests. Thus, the most popular image and video databases for evaluating liveness
tests, such as the NUAA [177], PRINT-ATTACK [14], REPLAY-ATTACK [33]
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Figure 1.2: Top-left: the real image. Bottom-left: the imposter image. To the
right of each image is the 2D Fourier transform of the DoG image [177].
and CASIA [33] consist of client and imposter images, or videos captured from
unprocessed photographs or videos of the users. In contrast, the DURHAM FACE
(DF) database [131], developed as part of this project, contains both usual imposter
images, imposter images obtained by photo-shooting printouts of sharpened client
images, and processed images displayed on a digital displays. On the other hand, it
is considerably smaller than the previous ones.
For creating a robust face spoofing database, a wide variety of parameters should
be considered, e.g. the camera used, the camera focus mechanism, the object dis-
tance and the type of printer that was used. Most publicly available databases do
not consider a wide range of parameters, so we intend to experiment with a set of
potentially useful parameters before the creation of the database. For example the
performance of a liveness test can be affected when using different printers to cre-
ate printed imposters. Besides, the problem becomes even more challenging when
considering imposters being taken from different distances. See Figure 1.4.
1.2 Research Questions
In this thesis we aim to answer the following questions:
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Figure 1.3: (a) the real image (b) the 2D Fourier of the DOG filtered real image (c)
the imposter image (d) the 2D Fourier of the DOG filtered real image (e) Sharpening
filter added to the imposter image (f) the 2D Fourier of the DOG filtered sharpen
imposter image.
1. Regarding commercial face recognition softwares and applications.
(a) To what extent are current commercial face recognition softwares robust
against even crude spoofing attacks?
(b) Does the performance of liveness detection in face recognition systems
affected by using a processed images i.e., noise addition, or blurring?
(c) Can we identify the compression threshold above which a photo can be
used to gain access to a face recognition system.
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Figure 1.4: Imposters with different distances from camera and printers quality,
respectively. (i)-(ii) Imposter was shot from: (i) 6 cm, (ii) 9 cm distance from
camera, (iii)-(iv) Imposters was printed using two different printers (iii) Ricoh
4500, and (iv) Bizhub c654e.
2. The robustness of available facial anti-spoofing algorithms.
(a) To what level would the liveness detection algorithms counterfeit spoofing
attempts?
(b) Does processing images in general before using as imposters change the
performance of a liveness test?
(c) How does each of sharpening, blurring, and noise addition affect the ro-
bustness of anti-spoofing technique? and which values are the best/worst?
3. Facial spoofing databases
(a) What are the current publicly available face spoofing datasets? and do
these datasets fulfill researchers requirements?
(b) Can we create processed imposters facial spoofing database?
(c) To what extent can we define parameters for the best database creation?
4. Convolutional Neural Networks
(a) Can the use of deep learning techniques increase the robustness of face
recognition systems against spoofing attacks with processed imposter im-
ages?
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1.3 Contributions and Limitations
The first part of our research corresponding to Chapter 4 of the thesis. We present an
experiment designed to evaluate four of the well-known commercial face verification
systems against direct spoofing techniques. The test has two parts; the first part
uses still face images collected in different ways and from various sources, i.e., trying
to gain access to the system by using a mobile photo of people, their IDs or photos
based on on-line social media means. In the second part of the experiment, we resize
some of the still images that were successfully been used to gain access to the system
and we find the minimum resolution required for such an attack. Although all of
the tested software was found spoof-able, we believe that some companies set the
default configuration to prioritise user convenience over security which makes the
evaluation of the potential resilience of this software against various attacks difficult
to measure.
The next part of our research corresponding to Chapter 5 of the thesis, test-
ing the performance of Tan et al. [177] algorithm against the claim that processing
operations applied to imposter images, like sharpening and smoothing, can be suc-
cessful in attacking face recognition systems. The main limitation of this part is
that we process images from NUAA database without these images being physically
recaptured. Although this approach allows for a better understanding of the basic
principle of the Tan et al. [177] and provides a clear idea of the effect of processing
images on detecting the liveness of the object in front of the face recognition sys-
tem, the real effect of the direct attack using processed images is still unquantifiable
without feeding the algorithm with physically recaptured images.
In the next step, corresponding to Chapter 6 of the thesis, we recaptured pro-
cessed imposter images, and we introduced our DURHAM FACE (DF) database.
DF database has been designed and constructed as a dataset of face images for
testing anti-spoofing techniques. DF database is, to the best of our knowledge, the
first database based on the assumption that the attacker may use image processing
tools to enhance the effectiveness of their attack. Our current database only serves
as a proof of concept, considering only one image processing operation on the client
images before they are printed. However, extending the database with imposter im-
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ages that have undergone other types of processing is a relatively straightforward,
even though laborious, process.
The next step, corresponding to Chapter 7 of the thesis is to explore statistical
analysis techniques that go beyond the drawing of the ROC curves, or simples re-
lated measures such as AUC (Area Under the Curve) which have some well-known
limitations [66]. Inspired by [67], we used the signal-noise decomposition model
based on beta distributions for studying the behaviour of liveness tests under pro-
cessed image attacks with the amount of sharpening treated as a parameter. We
evaluate this model with the fact that both with a classic liveness test and with
a tailor-made one, aiming at exhibiting the variety encountered in the behaviour
of different liveness tests under simple image processing operations. We tested the
database on a standard liveness test [177] and found that the more sophisticated
attack with processed imposter images is more likely to evade detection. The main
limitation of this part is that following, our previous work in Chapter 5, we evaluate
our approach indirectly, that is by direct processing of the imposter images, instead
of processing client images, printing them and taking photos of them which are then
used to produce imposter images. However, we note that the validity of this indirect
approach has already been verified in the results of chapters. Moreover, it is again
based on the very reasonable assumption that if a digital image is sharper than an-
other, then it will most likely remain the sharper one after both images are printed
on paper and recaptured on a camera.
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is one of the deep neural network models
applied on visual imagery problems. Despite the lack of large scale dataset, with let
say hundreds of thousands of images, we are still able to use deep learning to vali-
date our assumption that using processed imposters can enhance an attack on face
recognition systems. In the last part of our research corresponding to Chapter 8,
we are using transfer learning in CNN to evaluate the performance of face recog-
nition systems against malicious attacks using processed imposter images. A very
commonly used pre-trained CNN, the VGG-16, was employed to evaluate our claim,
using the extended DURHAM FACE database, which consists of real face images,
unprocessed and processed by various amount of sharpening imposters, created by
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being played on a digital display and recaptured by a professional camera.
The main contributions of our work can be summerised as follows:
 We are studying and demonstrating the deficiencies of some well-known com-
mercial face recognition systems against direct spoofing attempts, i.e. using
recaptured images of clients like ID photos or images on social media. This
study is cited in [130].
 Testing the performance of one of the well-known algorithms proposed by Tan
et al. in [177] against processed images, i.e. sharpened, smoothed, and images
with added noise. This study is cited in [132]
 Introducing our own face spoofing database, the DURHAM FACE (DF) database,
which contains a set of real, imposter, and processed imposter images, for eval-
uating spoofing techniques. This work is cited in [131].
 Testing the behaviour of using a tailor made shallow neural network against
malicious processed images attacks by the signal-noise decomposition model
based on beta distributions.
 Proposing the use of the transfer learning in convolutional neural network, the
VGG-16, to study the performance of face liveness detection using our own
dataset, the DURHAM FACE database.
1.3.1 Evaluation Methodology
Face liveness detection algorithms were found to be spoofable, we are evaluating
the robustness of some of these anti-spoofing techniques against malicious attacks,
including using processed imposters such as sharpening, blurring, and noise addition.
We are evaluating our work in this research with several mathematical techniques
as follows:
 ROC curve. We use the Receiver Operating Characteristic to plot the
True Positive Rate (TPR) against the False Positive Rates (FPR) at differ-
ent thresholds. This method represents the sensitivity or the probability of
detection in Machine learning cases.
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Figure 1.5: An example of ROC curves.
ROC is the most common method to evaluate the performance of the clas-
sifier. In some of our cases we noticed that curves intersects and the whole
family of ROC curves pass from a single point. So for example see Figure 1.6.
While there is nothing unusual in this behaviour, it might lead to a misleading
interpretation of the classifier's performance. That inspired us to study the
signal-noise decomposition of the output in Chapter 7.
Figure 1.6: An example of ROC curves passing from a single point.
 t-test. is a statistical comparison of two populations, and used when the
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variance of two normal distributions are not known. In our research, we use
the t-test to inform the design of the DF database produced by various types of
cameras. There were many choices for creating imposter, e.g. type of camera,
focus mechanism, etc. and we run small pilot experiments to see when some
of them are statistically different from others. Further implementation of the
t-test in section 6.3.
More details of evaluation methodologies can be found in the relevant chapters.
1.4 Thesis Overview
Our thesis is structured as follows. In the next two chapters, Chapter 2 and Chap-
ter 3, we review different biometric modalities, face, fingerprint, iris, gait and more.
Afterward, we discuss various spoofing techniques on different biometric systems and
we provide a review of a wide range of anti-spoofing approaches. We review face
liveness detection and some well-known and widely used facial spoofing databases.
In Chapter 4, we present an experiment designed to test the resilience of face recog-
nition systems against malicious theft of data attacks. In Chapter 5, we explore
potential vulnerabilities of the liveness test proposed in Tan et al. [177] by studying
the effect on its performance of simple image processing operations applied on the
imposter images, such as sharpening and smoothing. We introduce our own database
(DURHAM FACE database) in Chapter 6 which contains imposter images obtained
by photo-shooting printouts of sharpened client images. Chapter 7 aims at a better
understanding of the behaviour of liveness tests against processed imposter image
attacks, employing a more detailed statistical modelling of the output of the clas-
sifiers, beyond the plotting of empirical ROC curves. In Chapter 8, we present
the use of the VGG-16 pre-trained Convolutional Neural Network in assessing the
performance of face recognition systems against processed imposter image attacks.
We conclude and summerise our work in Chapter 9 and discuss the intended future
plans in that last section.
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
This chapter will provide a detailed background on various biometric recognition
systems of various types. We focus on reviewing face recognition systems but also
cover other biometric traits i.e., fingerprint, iris, vein, and gait, along with multi-
modal biometrics. Moreover, this chapter will provide a survey on biometric systems
spoofing techniques in both direct and indirect form, for various modalities.
2.1 Biometric Traits
Biometric recognition is based on the ability to uniquely identify a person by extract-
ing one or more distinguishing biological traits and processed with their statistical
analysis. These biological characteristics can be a person's face, fingerprints, retina
and iris patterns, hand geometry, voice, DNA, or hand-written signatures.
A biometric system has four main modules; sensor, feature extraction, matcher,
and system database. It performs three main tasks; enrollment, verification, and
identification. Enrollment is responsible for enrolling users into the system's database
by recording the user's biometric trait using an appropriate sensor i.e., a camera
for face or a scanner for fingerprint inputs. Then, salient characteristics are being
extracted using an algorithm called feature extraction. Next, these extracted fea-
tures along with pre-defined identifiers such as names or numbers are being stored
as a template in the database. For authentication process, the user provides the
system with a query; a different sample presented in front of the sensor, which then
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Figure 2.1: Enrollment, verification, and identification tasks of a biometric recogni-
tion system.
is being compared to the pre-stored template via the matcher that returns a match
score to indicate the similarity between the template and the query. A match score
should be higher than a predefined threshold for the system to accept the identity
claim [82]. Figure 2.1 illustrates how does a biometric system operate.
Biometric systems have also been defined as pattern recognition systems which
compare the collected biometrics from individuals after feature extraction with the
pre-stored user feature data in the database. Biometric systems can be operated
in either verification or identification modes. Verification mode is used for positive
recognition, where a one-to-one comparison process takes a place between the data
provided by the individual and data stored in the database, and aims to prevent
different people gaining access to the same identity account. In general, a verification
task validates the identity of the user by comparing the captured biometric to what
is already stored in the database of the system. Meanwhile, identification mode is
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used for Negative recognition, where the database is being searched for a match to
the provided template by the user. Overall, identification tasks can be summarised
as a recognition of the user occurring by searching the template of all individuals in
the database for a match with a one-to-many comparison [82].
When verification errors occur in biometric systems, these errors are one of two
types: False Matching Error (FMR) where some imposter can be accepted by the
system, and False Nonmatching Error (FNMR) where some valid individual can be
accepted by the system [82].
Biometrics are considered more reliable than other access mechanism since they
cannot be stolen, lost, duplicated or left behind at home or any other place like
physical access items (cards, keys, tokens, etc.). Nonphysical access items (passkeys,
PINs, passwords, pass patterns, etc.) can be easily forgotten, stolen, observed, or
even shared between more than one people. In contrast, these problems do not
appear in biometric systems [196].
Biometrics are comprised of biological behaviour and behaviour traits [38]. Bio-
logical behaviour which is also known as physiological biometric methods are based
on human body part measurements and prominent examples include face, finger-
print, and iris recognition. Behavioural biometric methods are based on human
action measurements and some well-known examples are gesture, key stroking, gait
and signature recognition [16,50]. Gesture recognition identifies the person by states
generated from any body motion, but commonly originate from either the face or
hand. Meanwhile, keystroke recognition is a technique of recognizing the user by the
rhythm he/she uses while typing characters using a keypad or keyboard. Another
common behavioural biometric is gait recognition, where the individual is been iden-
tified from the way he/she walks, as it has been found that each person has a unique
way of walking and can be used for recognition purposes. Signature recognition is
also another behavioural biometric where the user authentication occurs using the
signature and can be operated in two ways; static or dynamic. Static where the user
insert the signature using any mean of inputing and then the system recognizes the
inserted template. In contrast, dynamic signature recognition recognizes the person
from his time-strokes of signature on digital displays, in real time.
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2.1.1 Face Recognition
Face recognition is a well established research area with the state of the art tech-
niques achieving recognition rates that rival the human ability to recognize faces un-
der similar conditions. The input of a face recognition algorithm can be a grayscale
or a color still image, a short video sequence or a 3D scan of someones face. The first
examples of successful face recognition algorithms from still images were based on
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [163] and [180, 181], while further improve-
ments proposed in [142] were able to cope with large scale databases and handle
better the problem of pose variability by using modular eigenspaces. In Barlett et
al. [18], Independent Component Analysis (ICA) was employed instead of PCA.
Compared to the other main biometric authentication methods that use finger-
prints or high resolution iris images, face recognition has the unique characteristic
that it is based on data that can well be found in the public domain. Indeed, in
many cases it is very easy to obtain a photo of someone's face, either doing a quick
online search or by logging into a social network. As a result, face recognition based
authentication is particularly vulnerable to imposter attacks, when, for example, an
attacker holds someone's photo in front of the camera and try to gain access through
a face recognition system.
In [209] and [197], face recognition methods are classified into three main cate-
gories: (1) Holistic matching methods, (2) feature-based (structural) matching meth-
ods, and (3) hybrid methods. Holistic methods use the whole face region as input
of the face recognition algorithm. Eigenfaces [181], Fisherfaces [21], and Laplacian-
faces [72] are the common methods of extracting holistic face features. Principal
Component Analysis gives the best known example of Eigenfaces. The basic algo-
rithm was proposed by Sirovich and Kirby [163] and used for face classification by
Turk and Pentland [180]. The eigenfaces are the eigenvectors with the lowest eigen-
values of the covariance matrix of a high dimensional vector space of face images.
They are used as the basis of a lower dimension vector space of face images. The
reduction in the dimension allows for an efficient solution to the face classification
problem. Figure 2.2 presents a sample of eigenfaces calculates from sample images
from the DURHAM FACE database, see Chapter 6. Furthermore, the figure shows
2.1. Biometric Traits 18
the normalized faces and the mean face which has been used to compute eigenfaces.
Figure 2.2: Samples of Eigenfaces, calculated from a sample of images from the
Durham face database. Row 1: Grayscale sample images from DURHAM FACE
database. Row 2: normalized faces. Row 3: the mean face. Row 4: Eigenfaces.
Fisherface face recognition method uses Linear Discrimant Analysis (LDA) to
extract discriminative features of the face, instead of using Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) to find a subspace representation of a set of face images. The
Fisherface technique was found to have lower error rates compared to the Eigenface
technique [21].
Meanwhile, LaplacianFace is another linear method for face recognition which
models the space of faces as a manifold structure. It uses the Locality Preserving
Projections (LPP) to map the face images into a low dimensional face space. While
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) ef-
fectively assume a Euclidean structure for face space, the LPP in contrast finds
optimal linear approximations to the eigenfunctions of the Laplace Beltrami opera-
tor on a manifold. LaplacianFace gives lower error rates and a better performance
compared to the two previous methods [72].
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In feature-based methods, local features such as eyes, the curve of eyebrows, nose,
mouth, and the shape of the lips and chin, are first extracted and their locations
and local statistics (geometric and/or appearance related) are fed into a structural
classifier [209].
Hybrid methods combine both feature-based methods and holistic methods. For
example, [142] combines Eigenfaces with Eigenmodules (Eigenmouth, Eigeneyes,
Eigennose).
Other application domains of face recognition use unconstrained face images.
Such images can be captured either using mobile devices or surveillance cameras [23]
or images that can be found on the Internet [77]. Although the setting is quite
different, the techniques developed for unconstrained face recognition are relevant
to biometric security. The Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) dataset is one of the
most recent and familiar databases for unconstrained face images, which contains
13,000 face images collected from the web. LFW labeled each image with the name
of the pictured individual without any constraints been applied to the images. The
only constraint in the LFW dataset is that all images had been detected by the
Viola-Jones face detector. Figure 2.3 shows a number of images from the LFW.
These unconstrained face images are difficult in recognition due to the poor image
quality, inconsistent poses, expressions and orientations, variation in brightness [47].
Figure 2.3: Sample images from the LFW dataset. The first row shows random
samples of different subjects, while the second row shows different images of the
same subject.
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Lately, using both “Shallow” and “Deep” neural networks for face recognition
in images and videos has received considerable attention. At the beginning of using
shallow methods in face recognition, handcrafted local image descriptors like SIFT,
LBP, and HOG [36, 114, 164, 165, 195] where used to extract a representation of a
face image.
Recently, Convolutional Neural Networks have been used to improve various clas-
sification problems; object [69,70,99,161,175], scene [210,211], and action classifica-
tion [15, 85, 188]. Large scale research has been conducted to solve face recognition
problems using deep learning. One of the leading researches in the area is the one by
Taigman et al. [176] who trained a nine-layer deep neural network with a large face
dataset of 4,000 identities. Some other leading researches in face recognition use deep
learning; Chopra et al. [34] presented a method to be used for recognition or verifi-
cation applications by learning a similarity metric from the data. Face recognition
using unsupervised learning was proposed by Huang et al. in their work [76]. Sun
et al. [172] proposed the use of hybrid Convolutional Network (ConvNet)-Restricted
Boltzmann Machine (RBM) model for face recognition. Furthermore Sun et al. in-
troduced two new approaches based on the Deep IDentification-verification features
(DeepID) [171,173]. The face identity-preserving (FIP) features have been proposed
by Zhu et al. [214].
Further researches on face recognition using deep learning has been done by Hu
et al. in [74], where they proposed a new approach for measuring the performance
of a face verification on the widely used faces datasets, such as the LFW and the
youTube Faces database (YTF) by Wolf et al. in [195], by a new discriminative deep
metric learning (DDML) method. Liu et at [113] trained a novel two CNNs systems
for attribute prediction in the wild; LNet and ANet. LNet is a pretrained neural
network with numerous object categories for face localization, but while ANet was
trained for attribute prediction.
One challenge for the success of these methods is the large required size of the
training datasets. ImageNet is an image database suitable [44] for visual object
recognition experiments. Later on, the ImageNet project organized the ImageNet
Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) which runs annually to present
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datasets for general image classification tasks [153]. Google has trained the currently
largest face recognition system using 200 million images of 8 million different objects
[157]. This deep convolutional network is called FaceNet, and achieved an accuracy
rate of 99.63% on the LFW and 95.12% on the YTF.
Video-Based Face Recognition
With the rapid development of image acquisition technology, image sequences
from short videos have become a technically viable alternative to still images for face
recognition because of the inability to utilize temporal information of people faces to
facilitate the face recognition procedure. As a result, a multitude of techniques have
been proposed to overcome challenges associated with low cost video cameras, such
as low resolution and poor image quality. Techniques for face recognition from video
may be based on still image face recognition methods, or on multimodal methods,
combining for example video and audio, or spatio-temporal methods, analyzing for
example the trajectory of face features [209]. Figure 2.4 shows samples from MoBo
database along with cropped faces. The MoBo database contains video sets for
25 individuals captured using six high resolution cameras distributed around the
scene [64].
In a very successful approach to face recognition from video, Liu and Chen [112]
applied the adaptive Hidden Marcov Model. HMM was developed as a statistical
model used to characterize the statistical properties of a signal and was previously
used in modeling temporal information on applications such as gesture, expression,
and speech recognition. The adaptive HMM was used to analyze the temporal
characteristics of the test video sequences over time and the scores provided by the
HMMs compared and the identity of the test video sequence with the highest score.
In [112], the authors applied the adaptive HMM temporally to perform video-based
face recognition. They assumed that each frame in the video is a unique observation
and PCA was used to extract the a dimensional feature vector. Corresponding
feature vectors which were used as the observation vector for the HMM training
were extracted from the eigenspace. The HMM learned the statistics of the training
video sequences and their temporal dynamics during the training process, while the
temporal characteristics of the test video sequence were analyzed by the HMM in
2.1. Biometric Traits 22
Figure 2.4: Samples from MoBo database along with cropped faces [64].
real time during the recognition process. Figure 2.5, shows the temporal HMM of
the Liu et al. technique for modeling face sequences.
Another research in the area proposed by Lee et al. [104] uses low dimensional
appearance manifolds, a technique that was found capable in handling pose vari-
ability. An affine plane or each pose manifold, and exemplars are sampled from
video and clustered with K-means algorithm. Next, Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) was used to approximate each cluster by a single plane leading to a low di-
mensional linear subspace approximation. After that, the connectivity among these
linear subspaces was represented in the format of a transition matrix. The elements
of this transition matrix capture the likelihood by which frames will be making a
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Figure 2.5: [The temporal HMM of the Liu et al. [112] proposed technique for
modeling face sequences.
transition between a pair of pose subspaces.
Another video based approach is the Auto Regressive and Moving Average
(ARMA) framework proposed in [8] for video-based face recognition. It was found
useful for face recognition by utilizing the tentative information from the face dy-
namicity.
2.1.2 Fingerprint Recognition
Fingerprint is one of the oldest known biometric identification traits. It is eas-
ily available and can be considered as unchangeable over the time. Fingerprint
recognition is an extremely popular and reliable verification method because of its
propertied of accuracy, uniqueness, universality, and low-cost due to the availability
of inexpensive scanners. It has been proven by archaeological findings that since
6000 - 7000 BC, ancients Assyrians and Chinese have used fingerprints as a method
for identification [120].
Each finger of any human being has a unique mixture of ridges and valleys which
forms the fingerprint [120]; ridges are lines which form the shape of a fingerprint,
while valleys are the spaces between these ridges. Usually ridges and valleys run in
parallel. The first forensic use of fingerprints found in a crime scene happened in
Argentina back in 1893 to convict a suspect [68]. Rao [146] and Moayer and Fu [127]
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were the first to implement a tree model approach in fingerprint pattern recognition,
based on the ridges detection method investigated in [185].
Fingerprint features are grouped into local and global. Local features also called
“minutia points”, which correspond to unique characteristics of ridges such as:
 Pattern area, the part of a fingerprint that have all global features.
 Core point, the U-turn in a ridge pattern.
 Delta, the Y shaped ridge meeting.
 Type lines, two innermost ridges that are parallel.
 Ridge count, number of ridges between a delta and a core.
Meanwhile, global features are these characteristics noticeable by naked eye and
form specific shapes like:
 Arch, where an arc is being formed when the ridge comes from one side and
rise in the centre and then exit from the other side.
 Loop, when the ridge comes from one side and exit from the same side forming
a curve.
 Whorl, where ridges form circles around the centre.
A fingerprint recognition system comprised of five stages: (i) Fingerprint Enroll-
ment, where the image of fingerprint is being captured by the sensor; (ii) Fingerprint
Image Enhancement, a processing phase to remove the possible noise inserted at the
capturing level, basically in this phase a form of normalization occurs; (iii) Minutiae
Extraction, where both local and global features are being extracted, these features
are saved in the database for the next matching process; (iv) Minutiae Matching,
here matching similarities are identified between the test templates and the master
template. For a one-to-one matching process, or otherwise one-to-many for verifica-
tion; and (v) Fingerprint Authentication to return the result of the classification.
Fingerprint recognition techniques can be classified as Minutiae-based, ridge
feature-based, correlation-based, and gradient-based. Even though, most of the fin-
gerprint recognition methods are minutia-based, the noise and distortion occurred
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Figure 2.6: Top: Fingerprint minutia. Bottom: Arch, whorl and loop fingerprint
features.
during capturing the image via the sensor results in some missing number of minutia
details [80]. Thus, ridge feature-based techniques are used to overcome this limi-
tation [32]. Ridge feature-based methods generally suffer from low discriminative
capability, hence, correlation-based methods are employed to do texture correlation
analysis between pixels on different alignments of two superimposed fingerprint im-
ages [134]. All of these techniques are sensitive to skin condition, finger alignment
and amount of pressure, so the gradient based approach which does not require the
minutiae for alignment was proposed by Aggarwal et al. in [9]. The authors used
a technique based on subdividing each minutiae into many local regions which are
being used afterwards to compute the histograms of oriented gradients (HoGs) for
characterizing textural information for each minutiae location.
Coetzee and Botha [37] were the first to work on fingerprint recognition operat-
ing on images of low quality. They suggested to obtain a binarized image by using
both the edge extracted image along with the gray-scale image obtained by a re-
cursive approach tracing lines and their thinnings. The window was first centered
on the pixel with the lowest gray-scale value, and then changed its position to trace
boundaries of the ridge. The authors of [154] improved feature extraction from low
quality fingerprint images by adding noise to the original images. This phenomenon
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is called stochastic resonance where the added noise to the original signal increases
the amplitude to noise ratio.
One of the most powerful filters in noise removal is the Gabor filter which became
the most widely used approach in fingerprint recognition. It was first proposed by
Ratha et al. in [147], where a Gabor filter was used to create smooth ridges from
the noisy images of the fingerprints, and then a binary image was created using
thresholding. This approach was still considered insufficient for low quality images
as it could not detect local directions or ridge flow distances.
Various leading studies on fingerprint recognition using neural networks were
conducted, and the work by [194] is one of the very leading researches in the area.
Two neural networks were used; one for feature extraction and the other for classi-
fication. This method achieved 95% accuracy rate.
Furthermore, deep learning also got traction in fingerprint recognition systems.
Yao et at. [204] proposed a method that combine two machine learning approaches;
Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Recursive Neural Network (RNN). Researchers
have studied the combination of both the flat and the structured representation
for fingerprint recognition and tested their new mixed approach on the NIST-4, a
fingerprint database, obtaining a 95.6% accuracy rate Therefore, the results indicate
the high efficiency of using a combination of two different representations.
2.1.3 Iris Recognition
Iris recognition is concerned with the biometric details of the ring shaped area
surrounding the pupil of the eye. It consists of two layers; the central pupillary
region, and the outer ciliary region, separated by the Collarette. Iris has been
proven to be unique in each person and even from the left to right eye of the same
person [25].
Generally, Iris recognition systems have a lower False Acceptance Rate (FAR)
compared to other biometric modalities, but still have a high False Reject Rate
(FRR).
Bowyer et al. [25] summarized iris recognition approaches in three main cat-
egories; the Flom and Safir patent [52], Daugman's approach [41], and Wildes's
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approach [193]. Flom and Safir suggested in their unimplemented iris recognition
system patent, the use of illumination to increase and decrease the size of the pupil
to reach a predefined size. The authors recommended the use of an algorithm to
find large groups of connected pixels with intensity amounts less than a threshold.
Daugman mentioned in his research [41] that in order for the illumination to be
controlled and the possess been unintrusive to people, the use of near infrared il-
lumination is a must. Daugman's system relies on positioning the eye in front of
the camera, and either maximizing the spectral power in the upper and middle fre-
quency bands of the 2D Fourier spectrum by amending the focus of the system, or
giving an audio command to adjust the position i.e., tilting the head or moving it
to another position.
Figure 2.7: Example of an iris pattern, imaged monochromatically captured at a
distance of about 35 cm [41].
Daugman tested his algorithm with the United Arab Emirates's border agency
using their database of 632,500 different iris images, to check visitors denied access
to the country. The False match was found to be Zero [43]. Meanwhile, Wildes used
for his approach a low light camera with a wide source and polarization in [193]. The
author calculates a binary map and then finds the circles of the iris using the Hough
transform, then a Laplacian of Gaussian filter is applied to compute a normalized
correlation as a similarity measure.
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2.1.4 Other Types of Biometric Recognition
Finger-Vien Recognition
Some human biometrics may change over times due to age or any other circum-
stances. Palm vein, dorsal hand vein, and finger vein are common vein features
which can be used for personal recognition as these are considered as lasting unique
biometric details of people. Duo to the chemical properties on the blood, infra-red
light can be absorbed in the vein more than by tissues around it, thus the structure
of the vein can be captured either by infra-red image sensor or by the reflectance of
infer-red illuminations.
Since vein is an inner part of the body, it cannot be fabricated; it cannot be
easily recorded or recaptured, also it cannot be artificially re-made from any other
material. For these reasons, vein recognition especially finger-vein recognition was
given considerable attention in the last few years [190].
Figure 2.8: The exact place of hand vein extracting [48].
There are two main vein recognition methods; structure-based and feature-based
methods. Structure-based method depends on the structural characteristics that
can be extracted from vein patterns like points, curves, lines, or the structure of the
vein net [75,126,187,207]. In feature-based methods, vein patterns are considered as
textures and feature extraction algorithms are used for vein feature representations
[27,65,103,203].
Gait Recognition
In recent years, different techniques have been proposed for human identification
by gait recognition, that is, by studying walking actions of humans and recognizing
individuals by variations in their motion patterns. Gait recognition techniques can
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be either model-based or model-free. Little and Boyd [110] and Lee et al. [105]
both used the shape of the motion to recognize people by their gait. Sundaresan et
al. [174], Huang et al. [78], and Sarkar et al. [155] worked on model-based approaches
for recognizing gaits. Man et al. [121] proposed a model-free new spatio-temporal
gait representation called Gait Energy Image (GEI).
Figure 2.9: A sample sequence of the silhouette of a walking subject after background
subtraction [105].
2.2 Multimodal Biometrics
Multimodal Biometrics use more than one biometric trait for single detection pur-
poses. The more identification systems combined together, the more secure and
more accurate the results are considered. Various multibiometric approaches have
been presented in the last couple of decades [73, 167]. Ross and Jain [151] were
pioneers in using multimodal of biometrics for the purpose of identity recognition.
Many other hybrid approaches have been implemented; fingerprint and iris features
by Besbes et al. [22], multimodals of fingerprint, face and finger veins by He et
al. [71]. Moreover, the authors in [55] studied a combination of three different fea-
tures for their BioID identification system; face, video and lip movement. BioID has
been tested on 150 persons for a three month duration and found to be reducing the
false acceptance rate to below 1%, depending on the security level. The higher the
security level, the higher the false-rejection rate.
Choudhury et al. [35] evaluated a combined system of both face and speaker
identification using a Bayesian network. For the face recognition, they combined
face detection, head tracking, and eigenface recognition, thus it is achieving a high
recognition accuracy. The reliability of each method separately could be predicted
2.3. Attacks on Biometric Systems 30
by the derived confidence score. Yang and Ma [200] implemented matching score
fusion focusing on three multimodals for identity verification; fingerprint, palm print,
and hand geometry. The authors of [83] presented a recognition method using both
fingerprint and finger vein for enhancing the score level fusion.
2.3 Attacks on Biometric Systems
Both physiological (face, fingerprint, iris, etc.) and behavioural (speech, handwrit-
ing, gestures, etc.) biometric traits are becoming more popular than the tradi-
tional methods where pin codes, pass keys, etc. are required to gain access to
systems [10,24]. As biometric based security applications are becoming increasingly
popular, the study of their vulnerabilities and the development of countermeasures
has become a research topic of current interest. Obtaining illegitimate access to a
biometric systems falls in one of two categories; direct or indirect Attacks. Direct
attacks are based on theft of biometric data and are carried out against the sensor
using synthetic traits such as stolen biometric data of some form; digital images
displayed on a screen, printed face or iris images, or in physical form, for exam-
ple a gummy fingerprint or a fingerprint on a gelatinous membrane. In contrast,
indirect attacks are carried out against some of the algorithmic modules of the sys-
tem to construct an input biometric information, as for example through the use of
Hill-climbing algorithm and Bayesian statistics [59].
In [148], eight possible attack-points against biometric verification systems have
been identified. They are illustrated in Figure 2.10. Each point of attack is vul-
nerable to a certain kind of spoofing technique. Here, following that paper we are
grouping the proposed attack points into two main groups; direct and indirect.
 Direct attacks: where synthetic biometric samples are generated. These
samples can be for example; images of a face, fingerprint, or iris. Direct
attacks occur at sensor level, level (1) in Figure 2.10, and do not require any
pre-knowledge by the attacker of the inner parts of the verification system,
such as the used matching algorithms, the feature extraction methods, etc.
Besides, these attacks are carried outside the digital limits of the system and
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thus digital protection techniques such as digital signature or watermarking
cannot be used.
 Indirect attacks: These attacks require some extra information about the
working of the recognition system. Indirect attacks work at the inner modules
of the system in three different attacking modes: (i) changing the information
in the communication channel between parts of the system, (ii) attacking either
the feature extraction of the matching algorithms using Trojans to bypass
certain modules of the system, and (iii) attacking the database of the system
and manipulating the data in a form to gain suitable access to the system.
Indirect attacks occur at the remaining seven points of attacks in Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.10: The eight possible attack points on the architecture of an automated
biometric verification system.
In a more detailed description of the eight types of attacks shown in Figure 2.10:
1. Fake biometrics at the sensor level; where a biometric reproduction is presented
in front of the sensor to gain access to the system.
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2. An old stored digital biometric signal being resubmitted to the system bypass-
ing the sensor, e.g. an old copy of a biometric image or a previously recorded
audio or video. This attack is commonly given the name “Replay attack”.
3. Overriding feature extraction; e.g. this could be on attack by a Trojan horse
producing feature sets determined by the hacker.
4. Tampering with the feature extraction; this means replacing the extracted
features with a different reformed input signal to produce a different synthe-
sized feature set when the representation is known. This attaching mode is
considered somehow difficult, due to the inseparably between the feature ex-
traction and matcher stages of the biometric recognition system. Nevertheless,
the threat becomes very real when the extracted feature is transmitted to a
remote matcher, which could be done over the Internet.
5. Overriding matcher stage; attacking the matcher to directly produce an arti-
ficial incorrect match score of lower or higher value.
6. Tampering with stored templates; the attacker amends templates in the database
which can be either locally or remotely distributed over several servers. This
might result in either unauthorised access of a fraudulent person, or service
denial for the correct individual.
7. Channel attack between the stored template and matcher stages; this channel
might be attacked and the content being changed on its way back from the
stored template to the matcher.
8. Decision override; the final decision of Yes/No is being changed with the choice
of the attacker accordingly. This is considered as the most dangerous attack
as it most directly affects the final outcome.
2.3.1 Attacks on Face Recognition Systems
Spoofing occurs on various attack-points of the architecture of any biometric verifi-
cation system. Most major direct attacks happen at the sensor level, the first point
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of the architecture. The most common attacking methods are based on the ability
of generating synthetic face biometric samples, and spoofing the falsifying system
using, for example photos, videos, and/or 3D models [198], to gain illegal access.
See point (1) in Figure 2.10.
Pan et al. [139] classified direct attacks to face recognition systems into three
categories: a photograph of the real user is used; a video; or a 3D model. One
particular strength of such direct attacks is that they do not require any knowledge
of the face recognition system they attack. We review these kinds of attacks in
detail and give some experimental results on their efficiency against some popular
commercial level systems in Chapter 4.
Hill Climbing Attack
The Hill-climbing attack is an automated intrusion technique to generate a positive
classified input by analysing match score data returned from false input data. The
Hill-climbing attack can be classified within the second or the fourth class of possible
attacks on the architecture of the biometric system depending on the point of the
attack [123,148,182]. In other words, hill-climbing aims at reaching the verification
threshold by using the matchers returned similarity scores to modify the template(s)
used for the attack.
A hill climbing attack to a face recognition system was proposed in [6] where
authors reconstructed the image of a user with the help of face recognition match
score results. This technique showcases the fact that allowing access to biometric
matching results can implicitly but successfully allow access to the source images.
In Adler's research paper [6], the input image face is amended using an independent
set of Eigenfaces until the intended match score is obtained. The success rate of the
attack is not stated.
Bayesian Hill-climbing Attack
An indirect attack based on the hill-climbing algorithm and Bayesian statistics was
proposed in [56,57]. Figure 2.11 shows an example of successful attack using a hill-
climbing algorithm starting from a random face. Iteratively, these faces are modified
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Figure 2.11: An example of the evolution of the score and the synthetic eigenfaces
through the various iterations of the attack [57].
to be as close as possible to the PCA projection of the original targeted face. It is
noticeable in Figure 2.11 that the final image is visually quite similar to the original
face.
Galbally et al. [59] tested the robustness of two verification systems; the eigen-
face based verification system and the advanced Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM),
against the Bayesian hill climbing attack algorithm. Their attacking technique mod-
ifies a global distribution computed on the set of all users, by learning the local
specificities of the client being attacked. They report success rates of over 85% in
by-passing the system for all attacks, even without the use of the real images to
initialize the algorithm. The experiment was carried on the XM2VTS database.
While such indirect attacks are perhaps more interesting than direct attacks from
a theoretical point of view, however their applicability is limited by their unrealistic
assumption that the system is leaking information to the attacker in the form of,
for example, face matching scores.
2.3.2 Attacks on Other Biometric Recognition Systems
Attacks on Fingerprint Recognition Systems
Fingerprint recognition systems are vulnerable to spoofing attacks using artificial
fingers made from different materials; play-doh, silicon, gelatin, moldable plastic,
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or latent fingerprints [5, 160, 169]. In [51, 148, 205], the authors refer to Fingerprint
obfuscation which is a common term for the alteration of fingerprints by cutting,
burning, abrading, or removing part of the skin of a fingertip. Impersonation, the
creation of a new identity, studied by Valenica and Horn in [183], can be considered
as another fingerprint spoofing method.
Marasco and Ross classified fingerprint spoofing methods into two groups, de-
pending on the role of participants; cooperative and non-cooperative methods. A
method is considered cooperative if the real client participated in the process of
creating the spoof fingerprint. In contrast, the noncooperative method does not
require any collaboration from individuals and the process can still run without the
presence of the real client. Next, we are giving brief examples of both cooperative
and noncooperative methods [122]. See Figure 2.12.
Figure 2.12: A hierarchy of fingerprint spoofing methods.
 Cooperative duplication
– Direct Mold: the artificial fingerprint is created from live finger mold,
where the real finger is being pressed on a mold surface, i.e., plaster,
dental impression material, latex, or gelatin. The mold or the resulted
negative of the produced impression is then filled with some moisture-
based material to produce the spoof, e.g. it can be gelatin or any other
liquid silicon material.
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 Noncooperative duplication
– Latent fingerprints: There are many ways for revealing latent fingerprints.
One method is based on latent fingerprints left on any transparent surface
lifted with a powder when the real client -for any reason- touched that
surface. Latents can be removed from the background carefully using a
Scotch tape. This tape which now has the spoofed fingerprint on it is
placed on the sensor. Another method, the latents are also lifted from a
black powder placed on a transparent surface, then photographed using a
digital camera and printed on a transparent object creating a mask which
is then placed on a Photolithographic printed Circuit Board (PCB) and
exposed to UV light. The resulted plaster is filled with liquid silicon rub-
ber to create a very thin gummy spoof fingerprint which is then attached
to a live fingertip and placed on the sensor.
– Fingerprint reactivation: trying to retrieve the latent fingerprint left by
the real client on the sensor by usually simple means i.e., breathing,
placing a plastic bag filled with water on to of it, or brushing some powder
on the sensor.
– Cadaver: using a dead finger.
– Fingerprint synthesis: refers to reversibility of minutiae templates, which
means that a fingerprint image can be reconstructed from the template
of the enrolled user in the system. This minutiae-based fingerprint can
be then transferred to a manufactured artifact.
Putte and Keuning [184] created several sets of dummy fingerprints with and
without the cooperation of the real client and used these sets to test various finger-
print sensors against spoofing. This experiment, which took only few hours, found
that attacking the sensor level of the fingerprint recognition system with fake fin-
gerprints produced with the cooperation of real clients was more efficient than using
fingerprints generated without the cooperation of real clients. Furthermore, a suc-
cessful attack was reported by Matsumoto et al. [124] against 11 different fingerprint
recognition systems, using artificial gummy fingerprints of cooperative users. With
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a plastic mold and a gelatin leaf, the authors of [124] spoofed 11 verification systems
with a probability in the range 68-100%. Meanwhile, for the same experiment, this
percentage falls down to only 67% with non-cooperative clients. Figure 2.13 shows
samples of real and fake fingerprints and the average number of acceptance for each
device out of the 11 tested verification systems.
Figure 2.13: Row 1: Example of live, silicon, and gummy fingerprints, respectively.
Row 2: The average number of acceptance for each of the 11 tested verification
systems based on 5 tested subjects [124].
Martinez-Diaz et al. [123] have tested the performance of the Hill-climbing at-
tack on the NFIS2 system and on a Match-on-Card embedded system. NFIS2 is a
reference PC-based fingerprint recognition system, whereas the MOC is the hard-
ware based system. The technique proved the robustness of the NFIS2 against the
Hill-climbing attack, but on the other hand, it required high number of iterations,
more than 5000. Although Brute-Force attacks were more efficient with the NFIS2
than Hill-climbing attacks, the latter still requires less resources than the former.
Attacks on Iris Recognition Systems
Iris recognition is considered as one of the most reliable biometric modalities,
even though attacks to gain unauthorised access to such systems are still possible.
These are being done using several techniques such as using printed images, wearing
patterned eye contact lenses, using artificial glass/plastic eyes, or displaying video
sequences on a tablet or mobile screen in front of the sensor. Several countermeasures
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have been proposed by various researchers [39,40,42].
Raghavendra and Busch [145] explored the vulnerability of various baseline iris
recognition systems against malicious attacks. These tests were carried out using
their relatively new iris artefacts database (VSIA database) which comprises of 550
real and 2750 fake iris sample images.
Ruiz-Albacete et al. [152] created real and fake iris datasets containing images
from both eyes of 27 users in the BioSec dataset. They had two sessions, each
creating four images from each user, which summed up to a total of 432 fake images.
And then it was used to test possible attacks at the sensor level of iris recognition
systems. The authors experimented with a publicly available iris recognition system
in two attacking scenarios; the first is to enroll and later to access the recognition
system using the fake image dataset, and the second scenario is to enroll the system
with original iris images and then try to gain access with fake images. Both scenarios
showed high vulnerability of the recognition system. The experiment resulted in a
40% success rate in spoofing the iris verification system with fake images.
As well as direct attacks, researchers addressed the problem of indirect attacks.
Although indirect attacks on iris recognition are rare compared to other biometrics
due to the complex pattern of the iris, some research in the area nevertheless exists.
Gomez-Barrero et al. presented in [63] the first evaluation of indirect attacks on
a multimodal system based on face and iris recognition. They proposed two algo-
rithms: (i) the hill-climbing attack based on the uphill simplex algorithm to attack
real-valued matching scores, and (ii) hill-climbing attack based on a genetic algo-
rithm to use against binary matching scores. Their evaluation showed a remarkable
effectiveness of the attacks, proving the vulnerability of a multimodal recognition
system based on both the face and the iris, under spoofing and highlighting the fact
that even multimodal systems are vulnerable to indirect attacks as well as single
modality systems.
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Figure 2.14: Top: The process of capturing fake iris images. Bottom: captured fake
images with various image processing modification printed on high quality paper on
an inkjet printer; left to right: Original image without enhancement, fake image
without enhancement, fake image with histogram equalization, fake image with noise
filtering, fake image with TopHat transform, and fake image with Open+TopHat
transform [152].
Chapter 3
Liveness Detection
In the last couple of decades, spoofing attempts on biometric systems became a
serious problem. Thus, researchers in the area have developed various techniques
to counteract these attempts and eliminate the risk of unauthorised access to bio-
metric verification systems. In this chapter, we broadly review the most robust
anti-spoofing techniques for various biometric traits. Then, we provide a detailed
survey of the relevant face liveness detection methods and finally we discuss in detail
the currently commonly used facial spoofing databases. A more detailed review of
the [177] paper by Tan et al., which played a key role in informing our investigation,
and a discussion of their implementation approach is also included. Finally, we pro-
vide more detailed description of the fundamental classification techniques used in
this work; Sparse logistic regression and Neural networks.
3.1 Liveness Detection
3.1.1 Face Liveness Detection
Liveness tests are binary classification algorithms distinguishing between live faces
in front of the camera and imposter images, videos or 3D models. They have been
developed as countermeasures spoofing attacks at the sensor level of face recognition
system. In the literature, the term liveness detection is used almost interchangeably
with the term anti-spoofing in the context of attacks at the sensor level of a biometric
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verification system. Even though sometimes the term liveness test is not entirely
appropriate, e.g. an attack on a face recognition system using makeup, or an attack
on an iris recognition system using contact lenses.
In the last few years, liveness detection techniques have been developed rapidly,
although it is clear that these cannot be considered a mature technology yet. Indeed,
using imposter still images, which is the easiest and most basic way to attack a
face recognition system, are still very effective against consumer level of the face
recognition system. Figure 3.1 illustrates classification of possible attacks on a face
recognition system.
Figure 3.1: Various face spoofing attacks.
Liveness tests use the sensor input of a face recognition system, usually com
mon video, and perhaps some other forms of input such as images from an infrared
camera, and aim at distinguishing between those input objects that are coming from
alive faces and those that are not. In our research, we classify the current liveness
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detection approaches into five main groups: Frequency and texture based, camera
focus variations based, motion based, 3D structure based, and liveness detection
using special hardware.
Frequency and Texture Based Face Liveness Detection
Working with printed face images, Ma¨a¨tta et al. [116] applied a multi-scale local
binary patterns (LBP) to analyse texture features which were being used to detect
imperfections in the quality of printed faces. Ma¨a¨tta et al. combined three LBP
configurations (LBPu28,2, LBP
u2
16,2, LBP
u2
8,1), after which the resulting multi-scale LBP
feature vector is fed into a nonlinear SVM classifier to distinguish between client and
imposter images. The proposed technique resulted in (2.9% EER) on the NUAA
dataset [177]. Ma¨a¨tta et al. approach has been found robust, computationally fast,
and does not require user-cooperation, in contrast to other previous work in the area.
Figure 3.2 illustrates Ma¨a¨tta et al. proposed approach where face images are being
detected, cropped and normalized to 64 × 64. Next, LBPu28,1, LBPu28,2, and LBPu216,2
are applied and the result is divided on 3 × 3 neighbourhoods regions. Then, the
three histograms are concatenated into one and finally, an SVM classifier is being
used for determining liveness of the face.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the Ma¨a¨tta et al. approach [116].
Another work by Ma¨a¨tta et al. [117] used three enhanced feature histograms to
encode texture and the gradient structure of face images. A kernel map was then
applied to transform the feature vector into a compact linear representation, which
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was then used with a fast linear SVM classifier for a successful image classification
outcome.
Kim et al. [89] proposed an approach based on differences in shape and detailed-
ness to differentiate between real (3-D) and imposter (2-D) faces. The authors of
the paper used a method based on frequency and texture analysis to distinguish
live faces from imposters. They used the power spectrum for frequency analysis, ex-
ploiting information residing in both high-frequency and low-frequency regions. Two
reasons were given for using the frequency analysis; first, the fact that the generated
illumination components of 3-D shape images are different in the low-frequency re-
gions. Second, the difference in the detailed information between real and imposter
faces leads to variation in the high-frequency information. 2-D images suffer from
the lack of texture information compared to images taken from 3-D shapes. In their
approach, three feature extraction methods are being implemented; fequency-based,
texture-based, and fusion-based feature extraction. The Discrete Fourier Transform
(DFT) was used to transform facial images into the frequency domain for frequency-
based feature extraction. The frequencies form several groups of concentric rings,
each representing the equivalent region in the frequency category. Then, a 1-D vec-
tor of features is formed, that combines the average energy values of all concentric
rings. LBP is used to extract texture information from the images for texture-based
feature extraction. Finally, a Support Vector Machine classifier utilizes the outputs
of both the Discrete Fourier Transform and the LBP methods and produces decision
values. The authors of [89] have used two databases to evaluate their method; the
BERC webcam database and the BERC ATM database. The fusion-based method
resulted in a 4.42% error rate compared to the 5.43% frequency based, while the
LBP-based method had a 12.46% error rate.
Li et al. [106] proposed a liveness test based on the different distributions in the
frequency domain of light reflected from a flat 2D surface, against a 3D surface.
Their method is based on the analysis of the Fourier spectra of either a single or a
sequence of face images. It mainly focus on the structure and movement information
of a real face. Their algorithm is based on two assumptions: the size of a good
quality printed imposter image is usually smaller than that of a real face, and the
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high-frequency components of the fake photos are smaller than those of the real face
images. Moreover, the standard deviation of the frequency components in a sequence
of images is small even if the camera is in motion as the poses and expressions of
the faces do not vary.
Chingovska and her co-authors [33] introduced their own face spoofing attack
dataset (the REPLAY-ATTACK) which contains printed photographs, and photos
and videos displayed on digital screens of different sizes. They implemented Ma¨a¨ttas
work and tested it on three different datasets; NUAA, REPLAY-ATTACK, and
CASIA. The HTER was 15.16%, 19.03% and 18.17%, respectively.
Yang et al. [202] proposed a method for liveness detection based on four steps:
(1) segmenting the face into various components (mouth, eyes, etc.); (2) coding
low-level features such as LBP, HoG, and Local Phase Quantization (LPQ) for each
component; (3) deriving the high-level face representation by grouping codes with
weights obtained from Fisher criterion; (4) feeding the histograms from all compo-
nents into a classifier for identification. In their method, real faces are captured
once, while imposters are recaptured whether from a photo or from digital display.
The authors of [202] noted three main differences between client and imposter im-
ages: (1) imposters look more blurry than clients since recaptured images are of
limited details compared to captured real objects; (2) there is a variation in face
appearances caused by a reflectance change due to the Gamma correction of the
camera; (3) abnormal shading on the surface of recaptured images. The authors
first detect the whole face (H-Face), which is later divided into six parts: facial,
contour, right eye, left eye, nose, and mouth regions. Facial and contour regions are
then divided into 2× 2 grids to end up with 12 components. Dense Low Frequency
local features are extracted from these components to perform component-based on
coding to obtain local codes. These codes are then concatenated into a high-level
descriptor having weights retrieved from the Fisher criterion analysis. Lastly, these
features are being fed into an SVM classifier. Yang et al. [202] tested their ap-
proach using three well-known real-imposter facial databases (CASIA, NUAA, and
PRINT-ATTACK) and reported better performance on all of the three databases.
The authors in Tan et al. [177], use the Lambertian model to study the dif-
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ferences between live human and imposed image relying on two assumptions: 1)
live human face is a 3D object, compared to the 2D images of imposters; 2) there
is a difference in the roughness of real faces and flat image surfaces. To apply a
Lambertian reflection model, the authors proposed two methods for deriving the la-
tent samples: 1) Variational Retinex-based method; 2) Difference of Gaussian-based
method. Two extensions to the basic sparse logistic regression model were employed
to allow quicker and more accurate classification; 1) Spare low rank bilinear logistic
regression, and 2) a nonlinear model based on empirical mapping. For the evalu-
ation of their method, Tan and his colleagues tested their approach on their own,
publicly available, large photo-imposter database with more than 50K images from
15 individuals. For more details about their database see Section 3.4 of the thesis.
Table 3.1 shows the detection performance of Tan et al. proposed technique.
Table 3.1: Results of Tan et al. [28] approach.
Min Mean Max STD
Classification Accuracy 85.2% 86.6% 87.5% 0.6%
True Positive Rate 81.9% 82.4% 90.4% 0.6%
False Positive Rate 8.0% 9.3% 18.8% 1.3%
Peixoto et. al [141] further improved the Tan et al. [177] algorithms by address-
ing the problem of using high-quality printed images and images on digital displays
and also considering limitations related to bad illumination conditions. They ap-
plied contrast-limited adaptive histogram equalization (CLAHE), which operates
on small tiles in the image, before computing differences of Gaussians, increasing
the robustness of the method under bad illumination conditions. Then, a standard
sparse logistic regression was used, as in [177], to decide whether an image is real or
not.
Another anti-spoofing approach, proposed by Komulainen et al. [98], is based on
an SVM classification of histograms of gradient descriptors (HoGs). Experiments
conducted on two publicly databases, NUAA and CASIA, showed an improved per-
formance over the state-of-the-art.
Galbally et al. [58] suggested a novel software-based liveness detection approach
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based on multi-biometric modalities using an Image Quality Assessment (IQA),
where lower quality images are by default classified as imposters. Some of expected
quality differences between real client and imposter images might be: sharpness level,
degree of brightness, color level, local artifacts, and the amount of details found in
the image. For instance, a face image captured by a mobile device camera can often
be either under or over exposed. The proposed usage of the metric is capable of
operating on multi-biometric systems and under diverse spoofing contexts with a
very good performance when tested on various databases. It performed better than
the state-of-the-art.
Lai and Tai [101] recently proposed a liveness test against attacks by fake images
or videos displayed on HD screens by analysing the chrominance characteristics and
the saturation of the face recognition system's input images. The implemented
mehtod resulted in an outstanding success rate of above than 99%.
Further work by Kim et al. [92] on liveness detection uses the diffusion speed
to discriminate between the illumination characteristics of live face and recaptured
images. The authors use local pattern of diffusion speed values as linear SVM input
features, called local speed pattern (LSP).
In [7] the authors proposed an algorithm that extracts block-wise Haralick tex-
ture features from DWT frames obtained from a video. They use PCA to reduce
the dimensionality of the feature vector and an SVM is used for the classification
problem.
In a very recent work, Chan et al. suggested the use of two images one taken with
flash light and another one under ambient illumination. They noted that the use
of an additional light source increases the efficiency of texture pattern detection,
which enhances the differentiation between real and imposter images. The two
input images are analysed using four texture descriptors, LBP of face patches, the
standard deviation of the differences of two patches, and the mean and the standard
deviation of the differences of the backgrounds [29]. And in another similar recent
work by Martino et al. [46], 3D information is extracted from images without full
3D reconstructions, using as additional devices flash light and stereo camera.
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Variable Focusing Based Liveness Detection
Kim et al. [91] suggested detecting live faces by studying the differences in two
images taken in different (in/out) focus settings. In real faces, focused regions are
clear and the rest of the image is blurred, while in printed images, there is little
variation in focus due to images being flat. Their method depends on the Depth of
Field (DoF) of the camera, and uses a sequence of images to find the extent of focus
variation at pixel level. First two sequential photos are being taken with different
focus. One is focused on the ears and another on the nose because of the difference
in distance from camera lens between nose and ears in real faces. The gap in depth
between both sequences is adequate to express the 3-D effect. The Sum Modified
Laplacian (SML) is used to compute a value for the degree of focus. The last step
is to compute the difference of SMLs, which exhibits similarity in patterns for real
faces, compared to fake faces. This difference in patterns between real and fake faces
is used as the feature for face liveness detection. The method gave in 2.86% FAR
and 0.00% FRR when the DoF of the camera was very small, otherwise, it gave
higher average of FAR and FRR.
Motion Based Face Liveness Detection
There are two kinds of motion relevant to face liveness detection; either a set of
expressions or movements of the face, or movement of the face in relation to the
background. Recent approaches to liveness detection relying on biometric motion
analysis, focusing on different types of motion include: head tilting [17], mouth
movement [97], holistic face movement [96], and eye-blinking [137]. Foreground and
background motion correlation is used in [13].
Eye-blinking is the physiological act of continuous opening and closing the eye-
lids. A human blinks at least 15-30 times in the minute, with an average of 250
milliseconds for each one blink [88, 179]. Current cameras can capture at least 15
fps, giving frame interval of not more than 70 milliseconds. Therefore, capturing
two or more frames for each blink is possible, which allows considering eye-blinking
as a clue for anti-spoofing. There are three main advantages of using eye-blinking
in anti-spoofing; (1) No extra hardware or special tools are needed, (2) no user col-
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laboration is required as eye-blinking is a natural behaviour of human beings, (3)
eye-blinking is a distinguishing characteristics between a real face and a facial photo.
Some of the recent work on eye-blinking assumes highly controlled conditions and
requires high-quality inputs. Tian et al. [178] use a system of automatic recognition
of human facial action units. Moriyama et al. blinking detection method [128] is
based on the variation of the average intensity in the eye region, which is sensitive
to the illumination conditions and distortion.
Pan and Lao [137] developed an approach in liveness detection by recognising
spontaneous eyeblinks. Their eyeblink-based method does not require any additional
hardware except a commonly webcamera. The authors formulated blink detection as
an interface, where the user interacts with camera through blinking action, and they
used an efficient discriminative adaptive boosting algorithm for the purpose of quick
and accurate blink behaviour recognition. The use of the undirected Conditional
Random Field (CRF) framework developed by the authors to model eye-blinking,
addressed the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) limitations. CRF is statistical mod-
elling methods for segmenting and labelling sequence data. Since eye-blinking is an
action represented by and image sequences of open and close states of eyes, CRF has
been found to be convenient probabilistic method for the purpose of face liveness
detection based on the action of eye-blinking.
Sun et al. [170] also proposed a blinking based approach using Conditional Ran-
dom Fields for modelling blinking activities, using as input an eye image sequence
which includes images in both close and open-eyes state. Furthermore, the authors
compared AdaBoost and the Hidden Markov Model with the proposed CRFs model.
Their approach was tested using a set of live eye-blinking and imposter video se-
quences, consisting of 80 video clips from 20 individuals, shooting the action of
eye-blinking. The first clip of each individual gives a set of frontal face views with-
out eye glasses, the second clip includes a set of frontal face views with thin rim
glasses, the third clip includes frontal faces and black glasses, and finally, the last
clip contains upward no-glass views. Each clip has a duration of 5 seconds at 30 fps
at 320× 240 pixels resolution. Another 180 clips of imposters were used, including
various motion of the photos, such as rotation, folding, and transition.
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The use of an undirected conditional graphical framework to simulate a fusion
of eye-blinks clues and scene context clues was proposed by Pan et al. in [138]. The
experimental results showed that their system had the ability to counteract common
spoofing techniques.
Jee et al. [84] proposed a technique based on the analysis of the eye movement.
When an eye is being detected a sequence of input images is analysed to calculate
the variation of eye regions. if the result is a shape variation bigger than a threshold,
then the input face is recognized as live face, and as an imposter otherwise. For the
eye detection, the authors made the assumption that in case that image is a real
image then the intensity of the eye regions is lower than the rest of face regions. A
Gaussian filter was used for detecting face regions to obtain a smoothed 3D surface.
Local minima are then extracted, using gradient descent. Invalid eye candidates
are removed by Viola's AdaBoost method, and finally, they use Hamming distance
to calculate liveness scores for the eye regions. Their experimental results give a
mean score of 30 for live faces and 17 for fake faces. With a threshold set up to 21,
method's performance was at 0.01 for FAR and 0.08 as for FRR.
Kollreider et al. [97] proposed the use of lip movement classification, in con-
junction with detection based on face landmarks, for face liveness detection. They
used an SVM classifier for detecting lip dynamics, located mouth regions and ex-
tracted an Optical Flow Lines (OFL) in real time. The authors used the XM2VTS
database to evaluate their approach. Each individual in that database was recorded
pronouncing the digits from 0 to 9. They used a total of 100 video clips for training
and testing; 60 videos for training the SVM classifier and cross validation, and 40
videos for testing. Their method obtained an accuracy rate of 73%.
Singh et al. considered eye and mouth movement for face liveness detection
in [162]. They use the Haar classifier to identify both eye and mouth movements,
where eye liveness is demonstrated by opening and closing eyes in the considered
time interval, while movement of the mouth region is calculated at the mouth's
region of interest from detection of the teeth's HSV values.
Kollreider et al. [95] developed a face liveness method using optical flow pattern
matching for face part detection, relying on the fact that 3D faces generate a special
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2D motion that is more dynamic in the centre of the face parts such as nose compared
to outer parts (e.g. ears). Moreover, the observed parts nearer to that camera have
different types of motion compared to the parts away from it. In [96], Kollreider et
al. proposed a novel approach based on a combination of face part detection and
optical flow estimation. They used the Optical Flow of Lines to compute liveness
score. OFL is capable of differentiating between motion of points and motion of
lines, and was used to model and distinguish between live face movement and still
image movement. For face part detection, the authors combined pattern matching
with a model-based technique based on Gabor features and an SVM. The classifier
evaluation of this approach on a database which contained 100 video sequences from
the Head Rotation Shot-subset (DVD002 media) of the XM2VTS database with the
data downsized to 300 × 240 pixel resolution. 200 live and 200 imposter sets were
used and their method gave 0.75% error rate.
Chetty and Wagner [31] proposed a multi-modal framework for liveness detection
based on the face-voice fusion technique for individual verification. The introduced
framework utilises the static and dynamic bi-modal feature fusion, cross-modal fu-
sion, and 3D shape and texture fusion techniques. There, two types of photo attacks
were tested; type-1 replay attacks with still photos and pre-recorded audios, and type-
2 replay attacks of animated videos created from still photos and again pre-recorded
audios. The validation of the Chetty and Wanger proposed method resulted in less
than 7% EER for type-1 attacks, while it performs significantly better on type-2
attacks.
Moreover, Anjos et al. [13] proposed a method based on foreground and back-
ground motion correlation. Frischholz and Dieckmann [55] proposed an interactive
multimodal biometric system BioID, where the system randomly request different
head poses and movements from the user. Similarly Akhtar et al. proposed in [11]
an anti-spoofing technique using a multbiometric system.
Bao et al. [17] introduced the use of optical flow field to analyse the characteris-
tics and differences between optical flow fields generated from 3-D objects and 2-D
images. These flows are generated from four main movement types: translation at
constant distance from the observer, rotation at constant distance about the view
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axis, moving backwards and forward, and swing of a planar object to the view axis.
The first three movements produce similar optical flow fields while the fourth type
creates a significant difference in optical flow fields. Three groups of printed faces
were used to conduct the experiment; first, a group of 100 printed face images trans-
lated and randomly rotated. Second, a group of 100 images from the previous group
folded and curled before being used for testing. Third, a group of 10 individuals's
live faces each of them doing ten different gestures like shaking, swinging, etc. With
a camera working at 30 fps sampling rate, each captured video had a duration of
10 seconds, and computations were done on images sampled every 10 frames. Their
method cannot deal perfectly well with 3-D objects and might have low accuracy
when there are illumination changes.
3D-Structure Based Liveness Detection
These types of methods are based on the observation that is based on images, 2D
surfaces exhibits a lack of surface shape variation compared to those that come from
3D surfaces. Lagorio et al. [100] suggested an approach relying on the computation
of the mean curvature of the surface from the principle components of local Cartesian
coordinates. The authors tested their approach on two sets: a fake set and a genuine
vectra set. In their experiment the FRR was computed as zero. Another technique
on liveness detection by analysing a sparse 3D facial structure was proposed by
Wang et al. [189]. It is based on the fact that real images have more 3D structure
information, while imposters usually lack in depth. Facial landmarks are detected
and key frames are selected to be later used in recovering the sparse 3D facial
structure. An SVM classifier is used to differentiate between real and imposter
images. To evaluate the technique, three databases were constructed, using different
quality cameras, testing the performance of the method across different devices. The
measured accuracy of the proposed approach was 100% for the classification and the
liveness detection.
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Liveness Detection using Special Hardware
Developing accurate liveness tests is a challenging task and very often they require
specialized hardware, such as special sensors beyond the visible spectrum. It is well
documented that the accuracy rates of liveness tests can be boosted with the use of
specialized hardware. For example, consumer level products such as Windows Hello
require the detection of an infrared camera in the hardware setup before allowing
the user to enable face recognition based user authentication.
There are numerous researches in the area of face recognition anti-spoofing using
the Near Infrared Recognition (NIR). Socolinsky et al. [166] and Bebis et al. [19]
analysed face thermograms acquired by a thermal imaging camera. Kim et al. [90]
proposed the use of raw light field photography to detect spoofing attempts, while
Steiner et al. [168] recently proposed a liveness test based on the analysis of the
spectral signatures in the Short Wave Infrared (SWIR).
Face Liveness Detection and the Convolutional Neural Networks
Recently, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have been used to learn features
for face anti-spoofing, instead of using hand-crafted features such as LBP, HOG,
LBP-TOP, or DoG. Yang et al. [201] used a CNN to learn features of high dis-
criminative ability in a supervised manner, instead of using manually pre-designed
feature extractors. Their results show a decrease of HTER by 5% on two widely
used datasets, CASIA and the REPLAY-ATTACK, compared to the state-of-art.
Li et al. [107] proposed a novel approach based on using the deep part Convolu-
tional Neural Network. The authors firstly fine-tune the CNN on the face spoofing
database, and then to avoid the overfitting problems, the PCA method was utilized
to reduce the dimensionality of the feature space. Finally the SVM was used to
differentiate between real and imposter faces. Two spoofing databases were used
in validating this approach, CASIA and the REPLAY-ATTACK. The approach
achieved a better performance than the state-of-the-art.
Alotaibi and Mahmoud [12] also used a CNN for liveness detection. They applied
an Additive Operator Splitting (AOS) based scheme to detect spoofing attacks. Us-
ing a large time step they extracted the sharp edges and texture features, respecting
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of the boundaries location of the input image. Imposter images have less sharp edges
and more flat surfaces around the eyes, nose, cheek, and the lips regions, compared
to the real images. This is particularly true around the nose and lips. Alotaibi's
and Mahmoud's approach achieved a 10% HTER with a time step of t = 100.
This promising research direction seems at the moment to be hampered by a
lack of face anti-spoofing specific data for CNN training. Thus, for our research,
we either opted for a simpler ANN based generic algorithm which was sufficient for
some purposes, or used a pretrained CNN.
Despite the large number or researches in the area of liveness detection for face
recognition systems, no research was found that considers spoofing attempts using
processed imposters in any form. All researches were considering plain recaptured
images or videos from real faces, without being altered in any way. Hence, in our
research we decided to draw attention to the importance of considering attacks made
with processed images or videos.
3.1.2 Anti-spoofing Methods for Other Biometric Recogni-
tion systems
Fingerprint Anti-spoofing Detection
Fingerprint spoofing has been found to be possible and relatively easy compared
to other biometric modalities such as iris biometrics. Hence, many researches were
conducted for developing anti-spoofing mechanisms to counteract spoofing attempts.
Some of these anti-spoofing mechanisms rely on using an additional hardware de-
vices for retrieving information such as: temperature, heartbeat, blood pulse, pulse
oximetry, odors, or detecting a real finger surface by scanning of laser means, or
based on the electrical conductivity of the skin. Various anti-spoofing methods do
not require any additional hardware and depend only on software to obtain infor-
mation such as: ridge frequencies, textural characteristics of the skin, skin elasticity,
perspiration, or the power spectrum of fingerprint image.
Marsco and Ross [122] classified software-based fingerprint anti-spoofing meth-
ods into two groups according, to the nature of the extracted features; static and
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Figure 3.3: Hierarchy of fingerprint anti-spoofing methods.
dynamic. See Figure 3.3.
 Dynamic features. Are those features obtained from several frames of the
fingerprint acquisition device.
– Ridge Distortion Based methods: studying the skin distortion when a
finger is pressed against the surface of a scanner. The assumption is that
the distortion of live fingerprint ridges is more significant than that of
the fake ones. A high frame rate is required to analyze skin distortion by
processing a series of frames as a user is applying some pressure on the
scanner placing and rotating his/her finger on its surface.
– Perspiration Based: this technique relies of the observation that areas
around pores are getting darker over time, when the sweat starts from
the pores and spans over the fingertip, filling the areas between ridges.
This moisturising pattern can be captured by observing multiple frames
of a fingerprint over a span of time.
 Static features: where only a single image of a fingerprint is required to extract
a feature. Such methods are generally cheap and fast.
– Texture based: several textural properties differ between spoof and live
fingerprint images, e.g. morphology, orientation, smoothness, and hence,
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textures can be used for liveness detection. Various algorithms can be
used to analyse these texture-based features such as: Local Binary Pat-
terns, Local-Ridge Frequency analysis, Power spectrum analysis, Local
Phase Quantization, and Weber Local Descriptor.
– Perspiration based: here and unlike the perspiration features extracted
several frames, these perspiration based features are extracted from a sin-
gle frame image. Two such perspiration based features can be extracted;
individual pore spacing, and intensity. In individual pore spacing, the
gray-level variations caused by the regular periodicity in the patterns of
pores on the ridges is studied. In intensity-based features the analysis of
the gray captured image scale is usually based on histograms.
– Quality based: a study of the quality of a fingerprint. The measurements
can be related to strength, clarity and the continuity of ridges.
– Pore based: pores are detected using two types of filters; high-pass filters
which are used to identify active sweat pores and correlation filters which
are used to locate the position of pores.
One of the very leading researches in fingerprint liveness detection was done by
Derakhshani et al. in [45]. Their line of research uses skin perspiration pattern
and study the sweat diffusion patterns and the periodicity of sweat patterns to
detect spoofs. Subsequently, Abhyankar and Schuckers [159] applied a wavelet-
based algorithm to isolate the perspiration patterns and to extract and analyse
multi-resolution coefficients from the real images and imposter.
Fingerprint Liveness Detection with Convolutional Neural Networks:
Most of current liveness detection techniques are based on handcrafted features.
These features require a pre-knowledge of the domain of application in order to come
out with features that are able to work suitably with liveness detection algorithms.
The approach is considered an expensive way of engineering features, and usually
not all possible attacks can be handled with it. Thus, many researchers decided to
use deep learning to detect spoofing attacks.
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Convolutional Neural Networks have been implemented in many domains, and
were proved to have great power, especially with local feature extraction on images.
Nogueira and Alencar Lotufo [129] were the first to implement liveness detection
for fingerprint using the Deep Convolutional Neural Network (DCNN). The authors
designed their feature extraction and classification into two separate parts, the first
part is a CNN with Local Binary Patterns for feature extraction, while a Support
Vector Machine was the final classifier. The validation of this approach was done on
a database of 50,000 real and spoof images of fingerprints and achieved an overall
rate of 95.2%.
Wang et al. [186] was inspired by the work of Nogueira and Alencar Lotufo. The
authors proposed the novel approach in using a DCNN for feature extraction and
classification. They divided the image into small patches and used a threshold for
identifying background-free training data.
Iris Anti-spoofing Detection
Recently, it was showed that spoofing iris systems is possible by using some relatively
simple methods such as printed iris images, or videos, or purpose-made eye contact
lenses. For that reason, many researches were done to counteract attempts to iris
recognition systems.
Daugman [39] was the first to study attacks on iris recognition systems and used a
method based on the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), where the total high frequency
power was computed to assess the quality of fake iris images. The higher the total
high frequency power, the most probable the image was genuine, helps identifying
the clearer image. Daugman also introduced a novel sheet model of linear stretch
to study the changes in pupil dilations. Several other solutions for anti-spoofing
protection of iris recognition systems were suggested; some of them rely on the use of
special hardware tools [87,102,136] and others are only software-based solution. For
example, in [79,94,199], the authors study the use effect of cosmetic contact lenses,
while [191] depends on texture analysis for finding the effect of using someone's else
iris patterns printed on colour contact lenses.
Among all biometric traits, face liveness detection is the most developed research
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area, the reason perhaps being that developing spoofing techniques is relatively easy
compared to other biometric systems such as fingerprint or iris recognitions. As
a result, liveness detection for other biometric traits rely on the state-of-the-art
methods first developed for face anti-spoofing. On the other hand, most of the other
biometric traits use special hardware and are deployed in controlled environments,
making them more robust against spoofing attacks. Therefore, liveness detection
techniques developed for such biometric traits are not easily transferable to the field
of face liveness detection.
3.2 Face Spoofing Databases
For evaluating the effectiveness of any implemented liveness detection test, many
researchers designed their own facial spoofing databases. Nevertheless, only few
databases became publicly available. Here we are reviewing some of these public
databases:
NUAA is one of the earliest public-domain face spoofing databases, created in 2010
by Tan et al. [177]. It contains face images from 15 participating people, taken under
non-uniform lighting conditions. Participants were from both genders and were
asked to assume neutral facial expressions without head movement or eye-blinking.
The client image part of the database, consists of 500 coloured images of each
participant, at 640×480 resolution, taken by a conventional web-camera with a frame
rate of 20 fps. Client images were printed in three different sizes, 6.8cm×10.2cm
and 8.9cm×12.7cm on photographic paper and on a 70g A4 paper, using an HP
colour printer. Imposter images, were produced from these printouts with a Canon
camera from a distance that would allow the face to cover approximately 2/3 of
the whole scene. In addition, NUAA only includes images from hand-held camera
printed photo attacks.
PRINT-ATTACK is a publicly available database described in [14] containing
videos from 50 participants. The videos were captured under two different sets of
conditions: controlled and adverse. In the controlled environment the background
lighting conditions are uniform, while the adverse environment has uncontrolled
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Figure 3.4: Sample of the NUAA database. In each column, top to bottom, the
images are from three different sessions under various illumination conditions. In
each row, the left pair consists of images of real faces, while the right pair of images
of recaptured faces [177].
background lighting conditions. The database consists of a total of 200 real access
videos and 200 videos of spoofing attempts, which were made by using A4 printed
photos of the participants.
Figure 3.5: Sample of the PRINT-ATTACK database. A printed image of high
resolution is used for recapturing [14].
REPLAY-ATTACK the Idiap REPLAY-ATTACK database was released in 2012
by Chingovska et al. [33] as an attempt to enrich and overcome shortcomings of
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the PRINT-ATTACK database. It contains 1200 short video recordings from 50
participants; 200 real-access videos were captured by having real clients trying to
gain access to the system created with a video acquisition system built on an Apple
13-inch MacBook laptop, and 1000 videos of imposters holding photos or tablets
playing video recordings for at least 9 seconds. In total there are two 15-second
video clips for each participant of 320×240 resolution at 25 fps. Both real access
and imposter videos were taken under the two different illumination conditions. In
the adverse environment with a more complex background was used, and the office
lights are out, while is the controlled environment the office lights are on, the blinds
up, and a homogeneous background is used. For the spoofing attempts, two high
resolution shots of each person using a 12.1 mega-pixel Canon PowerShot SX150 IS
camera and an iPhone 3GS 3.1 mega pixel camera were taken. Spoofing attempts
were classified according to three different scenarios: (i) photos printed on A4 paper
(ii) on video and photos playbacks iPhone mobile display (iii) photos and videos
displayed on an iPad screen with 1024×768 resolution. The REPLAY-ATTACK
database was then used to evaluate the performance of a liveness test based on
histograms of LBPs, as proposed in [116], and an SVM as classifier.
Figure 3.6: Sample of the REPLAY-ATTACK database. Top row: samples
from the controlled scenario. Bottom row: samples from the adverse scenario.
Columns from left to right: real access, printed photos, mobile phone, and
tablet photo attacks [33].
CASIA is a database presented by Zhang et al. [208] in 2012. It consists of 600
video recordings of real clients and imposters from 50 different individuals. CASIA
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was designed with the maximisation of the variability as its main aim. The client
images come in three different imaging qualities: low, normal and high. The spoofing
attempts made use of either photos printed on copper paper, or an iPad display. The
database consists of 12 videos for each subject, 3 of which are genuine and 9 are
spoofs. Even though, CASIA is considered relatively a small database compared to
the REPLAY-ATTACK, it contains more diverse samples using a diverse range of
commercial devices, i.e., a high resolution Sony NEX-5 camera and a low-quality
webcamera, face variations such as pose and expressions, and types of attacking
attempts, such as cut photo, wrap photo, and HD video replay.
Figure 3.7: Sample of the CASIA database. Top left four images: set (L1 L4)
low quality videos. Bottom left: set (N1 N4) normal quality videos. Right set:
set(H1 H4) high quality videos. For each set (from left to right): live face image,
wrapped photo attack, cut photo attack and video attack [208].
BERC Webcam Database and BERC ATM Database are two databases,
each containing a set of client face images and 4 different sets of imposter face
images (photo, print, magazine and caricature). All images in both databases are
of the same size 640×480. The webcam database used a web camera to capture
the images, while the ATM database used a camera built-in on the ATM [49]. The
webcam database's resolution is higher than of the ATM database, since the built-in
camera of the ATM has a transparent plastic cover which has an effect in reducing
the resolution of the output image. Each database contains images from 25 different
subjects. All images are captured under three different illumination conditions:
indoors with no additional lights, a strong light towards the front, of the face, and
finally a strong light from the side of the face. The Webcam database and ATM
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database contain 1650 and 1200 image sequences, respectively. Each sequence image
consists of 10 frames.
Figure 3.8: Top: sample images from the BERC ATM database. Bottom: sample
images from the BERC ATM database. The first column shows real face images [89].
MSU MOBILE FACE SPOOF consists of 440 photos and video recordings of
genuine and spoofing attempts from 55 individuals using the cameras and displays of
a Mac Book Air 13-inch laptop and a Google Nexus 5 Android phone with resolutions
of 640 × 480 and 720 × 480, respectively. Each video has at least nine seconds
duration [192].
The papers describing these databases [14, 33, 177, 208] were the most relevant
to the development of our DURHAM FACE database which we will introduce in
Chapter 6. We note that all of them, unlike our DF database, are limited to clients
and plain imposters without any processing being applied to the recaptured images.
3.3 Binary Classifiers
Machine learning became a popular approach to classification problems, due to its
ability to automatically learn and improve from the training data. Machine learning
lies at the heart of almost any face liveness detection algorithm.
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Figure 3.9: Sample images of real and imposter faces from the MSU Mobile Face
Spoof database captured using: Top to bottom: (i) Google Nexus 5 smart phone
camera, (ii) MacBook Air 13-inch laptop camera. Left to right: (a) real faces; (b)
imposter faces generated by iPad video replay attacks; (c) imposter faces generated
by iPhone for video replay attacks; (d) imposter faces generated by printed photo
attacks [192].
3.3.1 Sparse Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is a widely used machine learning binary classification technique
[93,111]. It has been used on many applications such as bioinformatics [109,144,156,
212,213], computer vision [54], natural language processing [86,119], and document
classification [26,30].
Logistic regression is subject to overfitting. Hence, regularization has been ap-
plied to reduce overfitting problems and achieve a better generalisation for the clas-
sifier. In particular, `2-Norm regularization has been used on the Logistic regression
model in convex optimization problems. `1-norm regularization has been applied in
situations with high dimensional data to obtain sparse models.
Assuming a set of sample data x = {x1, x2, ..., xn} ∈ Rn, and the associated
binary class label a ∈ {1,−1}, the aim is to predict the label of a new example,
using the logistic regression model:
Prob(a|x) = 1
1 + exp(−a(bTx+ c) (3.3.1)
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where Prob(a|x) is the conditional probability of x having the label a, b ∈ Rn is
the weight vector, and c ∈ R is the intercept. bTx + c = 0 defines a hyperplane in
the feature space on which Prob(a|x) = 0.5. The conditional probability Prob(a|x)
is less than 0.5 if bTx + c does not have the same sign as a, and greater than 0.5
otherwise. Suppose that we are given a set of m training data {xi, ai}mi = 1, where
xi ∈ Rn denotes the i-th sample and ai ∈ {−1,+1} denotes the corresponding class
label. The likelihood function associated with these m samples is defined as
m∏
i=1
Prob(ai|xi)
The negative of the log-likelihood function is called the (empirical) logistic loss, and
the average logistic loss, defined as:
f(b, c) = − 1
m
log
m∏
i=1
Prob(ai|xi) =
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−ai(bTxi + c))), (3.3.2)
which is a smooth and convex function. The training algorithm determines b and c
by minimizing the average logistic loss: minb,c loss(a, c), leading to a smooth convex
optimization problem. In sparse logistic regression, we add a `1-norm regularization
to the loss to avoid overfitting; that is the minimisation problem computes: minb,c
loss(a, c) + λ ‖ b ‖.
3.4 Face Liveness Detection from a Single Image
The way human faces are captured by camera varies duo to different illumination
conditions, and the use of cameras with different qualities. Two major differences
between real human faces and faces in a captured photos have been identified; (1) real
faces are 3D objects while images are 2D, (2) there is a difference in surface roughness
between real faces and those in a photo. Using the Lambertian model [133], Tan et
al. [177] proposed two methods to identify latent samples by extracting the crucial
information about difference in surface roughness between live and recaptured face
images; a Variational Retinex-based Method and a Difference of Gaussian (DoG)
based method. Live faces taken by a camera are in fact images that have been
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captured once, while imposters are photos of a photo, i.e., an image that has been
taken twice. Therefore, the distortion in an imposter image is expected to be higher
than that of a real human face image, with lower photo quality in the imposter
image (less high-frequency detail). To retrieve image characteristics and be able to
distinguish between client and imposter images, analyses of the 2D Fourier spectra
[106] can be used, with the assistance of DoG in eliminating the noise at the very high
frequencies in the Fourier spectra. Besides, DoG helps to reduce possible lighting
variations in face images.
Thus, Tan et al. [177] developed two further extensions to the standard sparse
logistic regression model, allowing for a quicker and more accurate spoof detection;
spare low rank bilinear logistic regression, and nonlinear model via empirical map-
ping. In particular, they study the differences between two images Ir(x, y) and
If (x, y); an image of a real live face, and an image of a recaptured face, respectively,
under the assumption of the light reflectance of the face surface following Lambert's
cosine law [133].
The Lambert cosine low is applied to find the intensity of both real and imposter
images (Ir and If respectively) using the Lambert equation:
I(x, y) = fc(x, y)ρ(x, y)Alight cos θ, (3.4.3)
Where Alight is the intensity of the incoming light, ρ(x, y) is the reflectance coeffi-
cient, cos = n.s is the angle between the surface normal n and the incoming light
ray s, and deriving:
I(x, y) = fc(x, y)ρ(x, y)Alight(nt.s), (3.4.4)
I(x, y) = fc(x, y)ρ(x, y)Alight(nf .s). (3.4.5)
The employed two methods to derive latent samples to be used by the discriminative
model:
Variational Retinex-based Method:
The input of the classifier is the illuiminance part of the face image, computed
through the minimisation
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µ = arg min
∫
image
‖ ∇µ ‖1 + λ|I − µ| (3.4.6)
Where λ is the data fidelity parameter. An estimation of ρ is obtained using Land's
Retinex formula through
log(ρ(x, y)) = log(I(x, y) + 1)− log(µ(x, y) + 1) (3.4.7)
Differences of Gaussian Method:
It is based on the idea that real and imposter images exhibit different local patterns
on their Differences of Gaussians. The reason is that imposter images pass through
the system's camera twice which leads to missing high frequency details and lower
quality.
The work in [177] is very relevant to our study since we are testing the liveness
detection algorithm proposed there against our hypothesis that presenting processed
imposter images in-front of a face recognition system increases the chances of spoof-
ing a liveness detection system based on this algorithm. Notice that this algorithm
has been tested before only against unprocessed imposter images.
3.5 Artificial Neural Networks
Neural networks became an integral part of many machine learning applications in
various areas, computer vision being a notable one of these. Artificial Neural net-
works (ANNs), are connectionist systems representing computations in hierarchical
form. ANNs have been inspired by the human neural system and aim at imitating
a human brain. See Figure 3.10.
Consider a set of sample data of the form X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} ∈ Rn, where R is
the set of real numbers and n is the dimension. The associated dataset with binary
class labels y ∈ 0, 1 is:
D ∆= {X(i), y(i))}|Ni=1 (3.5.8)
where N is the total number of samples in the dataset. Neural networks transform
the input X to a desired output using the following non-linear transform:
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Figure 3.10: General ANN structure.
yˆ(i) = f(li)(f(li−1)(f(li−2)(X(i);W(li−2));W(li−1));W(li)) (3.5.9)
where, fli is the transfer function for layer li. It can be written in a more general
form after the decomposition:
fli(X
(i);Wli) = fnon−lin(X(i)
T
Wli) (3.5.10)
fnon−lin is a non-linear function, such as sigmoid(), or tanh().
3.6 Tools and Softwares
3.6.1 Matlab
Our research mainly deals with graphics and image processing algorithms and tech-
niques. Among many tools, MATLAB, which stands for Matrix Laboratory has
been chosen as the software for the implementation part of my thesis. MATLAB
has many built in vector and matrix manipulation tools, and also is an excellent
tool for solving algebraic equations and doing numerical integration, besides being
an extremely powerful tool for dealing with and presenting both 2D and 3D images.
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MATLAB has a lot of ready implemented tool boxes for image processing, and signal
processing. MATLAB version used for the project was R2015a.
3.6.2 Matlab Packages and Toolboxes
SLEP Package
Sparse Learning with Efficient Projections is a MATLAB package providing several
functions for solving a family of sparse learning problems [111]. Tan et al. [177] uses
the SLEP package, as it offers fast convergence rates and works well with the large
scale data they have. For example, to compute a sparse logistic regression with one
single regularization parameter we call the function. LogisticR:
[x, c, funV al] = LogisticR(A, y, λ, opts) (3.6.11)
where, A is the data matrix, where each row of which corresponds to a sample
image. y is the labels and is a column vector with a length equal to the number of
sample images m, while λ is the regularization parameter, and opts are the advanced
options.
The outputs are x, c, and funV al; where x is the returned weight vector, c is
the intercept, and funV al gives function values during iterations.
Matlab Toolboxes
We also made use of Matlab toolboxes:
 Image processing toolbox: perform images processing and analysis, and
can speed up algorithm in development. We used this toolbox in our research
for image filtering and enhancement, as we produce several filtered images
such as sharpened images using the imsharpen filter and, and blurry images
using the Gaussian filter.
 Signal Processing toolbox: This toolbox is used for signal processing and
analysis. In our research we used the Fast Fourier Transfrom (FFT) to com-
pute the 2D-Fourier of the DoGs of real, imposter and sharpened imposter
images.
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 Neural Network toolbox: in our research, we use this toolbox for creating,
training, visualizing, and simulating neural networks.
3.6.3 Evaluation
Liveness detection is subject to two types of errors, either access is granted while
the object is an imposter object or access is rejected while the object is a real
one. Their rates of these errors are called False Positive Rate (FPR), and False
Negative Rate (FNR), respectively. The Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC)
also known as ROC curve, is a graphical representation of the True Positive Rate
(TPR) plotted against the Y-axis, while the False Positive Rate (FPR) is plotted
against the X-axis, for various values of algorithmic parameters, most commonly
thresholds τ .
My research challenge is that when using DoG for deriving latent samples, as
in [177], the ROC curve of the performance of the various sparse linear discriminative
models shows a very sharp rising from the very beginning, meaning we have a very
high TPR values even for every small FPR values. See Figure 3.11. Our research
would focus on enhancing the spoofing attacks against such systems, to make the
TPR increase slower as the FPR increases.
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Figure 3.11: ROC curves corresponding to liveness tests with DoG feature images,
and various sparse linear discriminative models. Spare Logistic Regression SLR
corresponds to the gray dotted curve, Spare Low Rank Bilinear Logistic Regression
SLRBLR to the blue dashed curve, and as a specific case of the Sparse Low Rank
Bilinear Logistic Regression with rank = 1, SLRBLRr1 correspond to the red solid
curve. [177].
Chapter 4
Evaluating the Resilience of
Commercial Face Recognition
Systems against Malicious Attacks
This chapter presents an experiment designed to test the resilience of several user
verification systems based on face recognition technology against simple identity
spoofing methods, such as trying to gain access to the system by using mobile
camera shots of the users, their ID cards, or social media photos of them that are
available on-line. We also aim at identifying the compression threshold below which
a photo can be used to gain access to the system. Four major user verification com-
mercial tools were tested: KeyLemon and Luxand Blink on Windows, and Android
Face Unlock and FaceLock on Android. The results show all tested systems to be
vulnerable to even very crude attacks, indicating that the technology is not ready
yet for adoption in applications, where security rather than user convenience is the
main concern.
4.1 Introduction
Biometric authentication systems compare live samples with what the system has
previously recorded in its database to insure that only validated people gain access
to the system. Currently, biometric identification is used not only in consumer or
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business applications, but in the list of users has been extended to include govern-
mental agencies, at high level security applications.
Face recognition is one of the most promising user verification techniques. The
ease of using face biometrics comes from the fact that built-in cameras at various res-
olutions, are available in some of the widely used electronic devices, such as laptops
and mobile phones. Hence, many applications have been implemented supporting
face recognition for user authentication without the need to use any form of passkeys.
Instead, the user is just scanning the face in front of the camera. Recently, devel-
opers of smart phones have started including face recognition facility capabilities in
their mobile phones. Various vendors opted to include face recognition techniques
in their devices, e.g. Apple's iPhone X Face ID; the first mobile phone embedded
face recognition system.
Since social media became an essential part of many people’s life, millions of
images are published on-line on a daily basis. Thus, it is quite likely that among
all these heterogeneous sets of uploaded photos there exist clear face images, which
can be later exploited by potential attackers to spoof a face recognition system.
Figure 4.1 shows an example of an attempt to spoof a face recognition systems
using an ID photo or other photos obtained over the Internet.
Figure 4.1: Examples of spoofing attacks. Left: attempted attack using an ID
photo. Right: attempted attack using a photo found on Facebook.
Differences between real and recaptured images are not usually subtle substan-
tial, as they both normally look similar with only small difference which the human
eyes usually cannot detect.
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In a cat-and-mouse game played between attackers and anti-spoofing software
and systems developers of successful spoofing attempts have been reported by vari-
ous groups on several top-branded commercial products. These attacks range from
the very basic such as the use of still face images or video sequences, to some more
advanced methods, such as using pre-designed 3D masks to bypass a face identifi-
cation system [108]. On the other hand, Lenovo, Asus, and Toshiba laptops Face
Recognition systems were attacked by a team from the University of Hanoi in Viet-
nam using photos of the real users. Lately, and one week after the release of the new
iPhone X, many attackers claimed to be fool-able to “Face ID”, which was claimed
to be a futuristic new authentication technique. Fingerprint recognition commercial
systems also suffer from similar vulnerabilities. For instance, the German hackers
group Chaos Computer Club was successful in spoofing the fingerprint scanner in
Apples iPhone 5S.
Enhancing the security of face recognition systems is a major challenge since
a secure system should be able to withstand a variety of attacks, ranging from
systematic algorithmic attacks to attacks based on theft of data. In this chapter, we
present an experiment designed to test the resilience of commercial face recognition
systems against theft of data attacks. The first part of the experiment uses still face
images collected in different ways and from various sources, i.e., instant still images
taken during the experiment by a smartphones camera; ID card photos; images
found through Google image searches and images on social media platforms such as
Facebook and WhatsApp. In the second part of the experiment, we resize some of
the still images that were successfully used to gain access to the system and we find
the minimum resolution required for such an attack.
The main contribution of the chapter is a demonstration that some of the well-
known face recognition systems can be spoofed by crude techniques and images that
can be easily found on-line. In practice, that means the development of commercial
face recognition system should give more consideration into the possibility that an
attacker can use publicly accessible images for attacking their systems. Also, we
are highlighting the fact that a lower than the original image resolution, does not
necessarily result in a failed spoofing attempt, in fact even very low quality images
4.2. Commercial Face Recognition Systems 73
can be used to successfully gain access to various commercial systems.
The main limitation of our study is that due to the large number of available
commercial face recognition systems, we could not run our tests on the majority
of these systems. Furthermore, as it seems that the developers of such systems
prioritise user convenience over security, and as of these many products have a
variation on possible security configurations, it is difficult to quantitatively measure
the potential robustness of the underlaying anti-spoofing algorithms.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2 we review the
four tested commercial face recognition systems. In Section 4.3, we discuss our
experimental setup, introducing the relevant software and hardware, and describing
the environment of the experiment. In Section 4.4, we present and discuss the
results, and finally we conclude in Section 4.5.
4.2 Commercial Face Recognition Systems
Face recognition systems are able to identify and verify the identity of a person from
a digital image from a stil photo or a short video clip. Currently, there are hundreds
of such systems employed various applications such as security or payments. Among
these systems, for our study we chose for testing four widely available commercial
tools; KeyLemon, Luxand Blink, Android Face Unlock and FaceLock for Apps.
KeyLemon
KeyLemon is a biometric authentication solution based on face and speaker recogni-
tion. It offers a non-password login to Windows using face recognition on a standard
webcam and it can also be used for login to web based systems such as Facebook and
Twitter. KeyLemon claims that its latest face recognition algorithms enhance se-
curity by using 3D depth sense cameras to combine depth, near-infrared and colour
information [1]. Here, we run the freely available version of the system on a common
laptop hardware configuration which did not support such features.
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Luxand Blink
Luxand Blink is one of the most popular user verification systems to be used as a
convenient alternative to passwords. It supports quick login on different operating
systems, e.g. Windows, Mac OS, linux, iOS and Android. Luxand Blink's algorithm
processes the coordinates of 40 facial feature points such as mouth corners, nose tip,
eyes, eye corners and eyebrows [4].
Android Face UnLock
It was first released for the Android 4.0 “Ice Cream Sandwich” for unlocking Android
mobile phones. Afterwards, an enhanced version was offered on Android 4.1 “Jelly
Bean” with a new liveness test option embedded, which checks if the person in front
of the camera is blinking making sure they are real [2]. Being a non-standard feature
requiring user interaction, here we did not enable this liveness test.
FaceLock for Apps
FaceLock for Apps is an alternative face recognition tool for locking either an An-
droid phone or some of its applications. It is a very popular system, having a 4/5 star
rating based on the feedback from more than 10,000 users on Google Play store [3].
Windows Hello for Windows 10
Windows Hello is a face and/or fingerprint biometric authentication system provid-
ing instant access to Windows 10 devices. It is claimed to be more convenient and
secure than the standard typing of password. However, special hardware will be
required to use Windows Hello, including a fingerprint reader and/or an illuminated
IR sensor for detecting and verifying the liveness of faces [20]. We did not test
Windows Hello on Windows 10 because of the extra hardware requirements.
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4.3 Experimental Setup
4.3.1 General Setup
Two operating systems were tested in the experiment: Windows 8.1 and Google
Android 4.4.2. A laptop with Windows 8.1, Intel Core i3 CPU @ 1.90 GHz, 4
GB RAM, 64-bit Operating System and a Front HD webcam was used to test the
KeyLemon and Luxand Blink systems. A Samsung Galaxy S4 mobile phone running
Android 4.4.2 with a 2MP front camera was used to test the Android built-in Face
Unlock and the FaceLock for Apps. A Samsung Galaxy S4 with a 13 MP rear
camera was used to take images of the participant at a resolution of 2322 × 4128
pixels (9:16). The images were taken from different distances: one at short distance
(50 cm) where the face was 15% of the full image, one at intermediate distance (100
cm) where the face was 3% of the full image, and one at far distance (150 cm) where
the face was 0.8% if the full image.
Figure 4.2: Instant photos of a participant taken by a Samsung Galaxy S4 Rear 13
MP camera at various distances. Left to right, the camera distance is: (i) 50 cm,
(ii) 100 cm, (iii) 150 cm.
The experiment took place in Amman, Jordan in an indoors environment under
stable, good illumination conditions. There were five participants in total, of various
ages, male and female, without any specific requirement for their computer skills.
Since we did not run any statistical tests over the results, there was no need for a
larger number of participants. On the other hand, the repetition of essentially the
same experiment five times, rather than just one or two, gave us more confidence in
our analysis and conclusions.
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4.3.2 Systems Setup
The recommended default levels of security were chosen for all tested systems. In
particular, the KeyLemon security level, which ultimately is a trade-off between
convenience of use and security, was set at medium recognition accuracy. In Luxand
Blink, the high convenience mode was set, while the medium security level was
chosen for the Facelock for Apps system. The Android Face Unlock does not have
any such parameters to set up.
4.3.3 The Experiment
Prior to the experiment each of the five participants was asked to sign a consent
form. The form contained a brief about the experiment and a reassurance that
there were no direct risks to them by participating to the study. The duration
of the experiment was about one hour per participant and it was split in to four
sessions.
In the first session, the participants were asked to register with the four systems
and test their registration. In the second session, the participants were involved in
a photoshoot session in which three frontal face images of them from distances of
50 cm, 100 cm and 150 cm were taken and then the participants were asked to try
to gain access to the system using these images displayed on a smartphone camera.
In the third session, the participants were asked to try to gain access to the systems
using the photo of their Jordanian national ID card. Finally, the participants were
asked to find three face-front photos of them published on the Internet/social media
and these photos, displayed on a smartphone camera were again used to try to
gain access to the systems. After the end of the four sessions, we compressed the
participant's photos that were taken in the second session at distance 50 cm from
the camera and tried to gain access to the system until the maximum compression
ratio still allowing access to the system was found.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Gaining Access to the System
Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show the results from each experimental session and each
participant; use of instant photos taken by the mobile phone from various distances
(50 cm, 100 cm, and 150 cm), use of ID photos, and use of photos found on the
Internet or means in social media sites, respectively.
The participants were all able to gain access to all systems with a smartphone
shot taken from a distance of 50 cm, while frontal images taken from distances
of 100 cm and 150 cm were not able to gain access to any of the tested systems.
However, as the compression results in Section 4.4.2 indicate, the participant can
easily gain access using longer distance photos, after zooming into their face and
cropping the image. Getting access to the systems using ID photos was partially
successful. Android Face Unlock had the highest by-pass rate standing at 3/5,
followed by keyLemon with 2/5 and then Luxand Blink and FaceLock for Apps
with 1/5. Photos on the Internet and/or social media were also partially successful
in gaining access to the tested systems. KeyLemon had a successful by-pass rate of
7/15, followed by Luxand Blink and Android Face Unlock with 5/15 and FaceLock
for Apps with 3/15.
4.4.2 Compression Results
Table 4.4 shows the lowest filesize for the compressed photos that were taken at a
distance of 50 cm from the camera such that access to the system was still possible.
The filesizes are given as percentages of the filesize of the original images. All
photos are encoded in JPEG, the resolution is 2322 × 4128 (9:16) and the face
covers approximately 15% of the whole image.
We notice that even highly compressed images successfully can be used to gain
access to the tested systems. That suggests that the failure in gaining access with
the long range images (100 cm and 150 cm) was most probably due to particular
system settings requiring the recognised face to be closer to the camera, rather than
the lack of enough information in the long range images. To test this hypothesis, the
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Table 4.1: Results of instant photos using a mobile phone at various distances.
Instant Photo by a mobile phone taken from a close distance (ap-
prox. 50 cm) was successful in gaining access to the following system:
(Yes/No)
System E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Average
KeyLemon Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100%
Luxand Blink Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100%
Android Face Unlock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100%
FaceLock for Apps Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100%
Instant Photo by a mobile phone taken from a close distance (ap-
prox. 100 cm) was successful in gaining access to the following system:
(Yes/No)
System E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Average
KeyLemon No No No No No 0%
Luxand Blink No No No No No 0%
Android Face Unlock No No No No No 0%
FaceLock for Apps No No No No No 0%
Instant Photo by the mobile phone taken from a close distance (ap-
prox. 150 cm) was successful in gaining access to the following system:
(Yes/No)
System E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Average
KeyLemon No No No No No 0%
Luxand Blink No No No No No 0%
Android Face Unlock No No No No No 0%
FaceLock for Apps No No No No No 0%
images taken from the 150 cm distance were cropped around the face, compressed as
50 kb JPEG files, and finally resized by an x2 zoom. In all five cases, these cropped,
compressed and zoomed-in images were successfully used to gain access to all five
systems.
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Table 4.2: Results of using ID Photos.
ID photo was successful in gaining access to the following system:
(Yes/No)
System E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Average
KeyLemon No No Yes Yes No 40%
Luxand Blink No No No Yes No 20%
Android Face Unlock No Yes Yes Yes No 60%
FaceLock for Apps No No No Yes No 20%
Table 4.3: Results of using photos on the Internet and social media.
Photos on the Internet/Social Media were successful in gaining access
to the following systems: (Number of successful images out of 3)
System E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Average
KeyLemon 1 1 2 2 1 46.67%
Luxand Blink 0 1 1 2 1 33.33%
Android Face Unlock 1 0 1 2 1 33.33%
FaceLock for Apps 0 0 0 2 1 20.00%
Table 4.4: Smallest filesize of compressed images as a percentage of the original.
Tool E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Average
KeyLemon 2% 3% 2% 2% 3% 2%
Luxand Blink 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4%
Face Unlock 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1%
FaceLock for Apps 2% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2%
4.4.3 Processing the Images with Noise and Blur
Since face recognition algorithms tolerate a lot of noise, further experiments were
conducted trying to gain access after using some simple image processing techniques
on our images: addition of “salt and pepper” noise and Gaussian blur. The addition
of noise and the removal of any pre-existing noise through the Gaussian blur can
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be seen as simulations of a stochastic resonance phenomenon, and thus, this part of
the experiment can be seen as an evaluation of the robustness of the tested systems
under stochastic resonance.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6, show the results of access/denied access for the keyLemon
system after adding various amounts of salt and pepper noise and a Gaussian blur
with different sigma values.
Figure 4.3: Sample photos with additional salt and pepper noise of various amounts.
Left to right: 0.01, 0.2, 0.28, 0.29, and 0.35.
Figure 4.4: Sample photos after applying a Gaussian filter with different σ values.
Left to right: 10, 27, and 28.
4.5 Conclusions
We tested four user verification systems based on face recognition against basic,
direct presentation attacks. We found all of them to be vulnerable even against
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Table 4.5: Access/denial results of the keyLemon system after applying salt and
pepper noise of various amounts.
Density 0.01 0.2 0.28 0.29 0.35
Result successful successful successful unsuccessful unsuccessful
Table 4.6: Access/denial results of the keyLemon system after applying Gaussian
filter with different sigma values.
Sigma (σ) 10 27 28
Result successful successful unsuccessful
the crudest of attacks, such as using highly compressed still images taken with
smartphone cameras, or using still images that can be found on social media. We
believe that part of the high success rate of the attacks is due to the developers
of the systems prioritising user convenience over security, at least in the default
configuration of their products. However, the question on whether face recognition,
at least by its own, is suitable for user verification can also be raised. Indeed, face
recognition seems to rely on data which are personal in nature but, nevertheless, are
often either already in the public domain, or can be easily stolen.
Chapter 5
Resilience of Luminance based
Liveness Tests under Attacks with
Processed Imposter Images
Face recognition systems are widely used for user authentication in common every-
day applications. However, their vulnerability to even crude imposter photo attacks,
as for example when an imposter gain access to a system by holding a photo of the
rightful user in front of the camera, means that their use is restricted to applications
where security is not considered critical. Liveness tests are countermeasures against
such attacks, aiming at verifying that a live face rather than a photo stands in front
of the camera of the face recognition system.
The current state of the art, such as the Tan et al. paper [177], is based on ma-
chine learning algorithms trained to distinguish between images of live faces taken by
the face recognition system and images of photos fed to the system by the imposters.
In particular, it has been established that different reflectance properties of these
two categories of surfaces, i.e., real face and photo, can lead to the development of
effective liveness test.
In this chapter, we study the resilience of this standard liveness test against
imposter photo attacks, under the additional assumption that the photos used in
the attack may have been processed. In particular, we study experimentally the
effect of common image processing operations such as sharpening and smoothing,
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as well as corruption with salt and pepper noise. The results verify and quantify
the claim that this type of liveness tests rely on the fact that the imposter photo
images are usually less sharp than live images of faces. We argue that this indicates
a possible vulnerability of such liveness tests from attacks with processed imposter
images.
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we explore potential vulnerabilities of the liveness test proposed in the
Tan et al. [177] by studying the effect on its performance of simple image processing
operations applied of the imposter images, such as sharpening and smoothing. We
focus on the variant of their algorithm which is using differences of Gaussians to
create the input data and sparse logistic regression to create the classifier.
As a possible explanation of why their classifier is effective, Tan et al. observe
that images of face photos fed into the system by imposters tend to be smoother,
as in the scene that they lack in details. In this chapter, we verify and quantify
this claim by processing the imposter images of the NUAA database and measuring
the performance of their algorithm. We note that, as expected, the sharpening
of the imposter images reduces the accuracy rates of their liveness test, while the
smoothing of the imposter images increases accuracy rates. We also note that this
is a demonstration of a potential vulnerability of their liveness test. Indeed, one can
reasonably expect that by holding a sharpened face photo in front of the system’s
camera, the image read by that camera will also be sharper. That is, one can
reasonably expect that the sharpening attack we demonstrated on the imposter
images of the NUAA database can be replicated under real life conditions.
The main contribution of the chapter is a demonstration that the accuracy rates
of the liveness tests in [177] are sensitive to the processing of the imposter images.
In practice, that means that a rigorous evaluation of a liveness test against imposter
image attacks should take into account the possibility that the attacker has processed
the images they used to gain access to the system. We believe that this is a rather
simple attack enhancing technique which has been largely overlooked in the literature
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of luminance based liveness tests.
The main limitation of our study is that we process the imposter images of the
NUAA database, which are images of a photo of the subject, rather than processing
the photos of the subject and recapturing them with the camera before feeding them
into the system. While this allows us a better and more quantitative understanding
of the basic principle underlying the Tan et al. algorithm, we note that it is not
a direct attack and that the effect of a direct attack, consisting of processing the
photo of the subject and feeding it into the system, will be studied in Chapter 6.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2, we briefly discuss
the design of our experiment. In Section 5.3, we present the results and we briefly
conclude in Section 5.4.
5.2 Implementation
In this section, we first discuss some details of the liveness test of Tan et al. and
our implementation of it and then we describe the design of our experiment.
5.2.1 Liveness Test
In [177], Tan et al. proposed a series of liveness tests based on the same principle.
Information sensitive to the reflectance properties of the scene is extracted from the
image and it is used to train a binary classifier so that it can distinguish between
images of live faces and images of photos of faces. The variant we implemented
here extracts a Difference of Gaussians from the image and uses it to train a sparse
logistic regression classifier.
Regarding the difference of Gaussians of the images, following the recommen-
dation in [177], we smooth the image using a Gaussian filter with σ1 = 0.5 and a
Gaussian filter with σ2 = 1.0 and then compute the difference of the two smoothed
images.
Regarding the machine learning part of the algorithm, following the notation and
parameter choices in [177], we use the class labels {−1, 1}, where −1 corresponds
to client images and 1 to imposter images and the conditional probability of the
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imposter class y = 1 is given by:
Prob(y|x) = 1
1 + exp(−y(wTx+ b) (5.2.1)
where x is the sample image, and w and b are the weight vector and the intercept
returned by the logistic regression. To avoid overfitting, the values of w and b are
computed through the minimization of the cost function
min
w,b
loss(w, b) + λ‖w‖1 (5.2.2)
where λ is a user defined constant favoring sparse weight vectors, that is, vectors
with most of their elements equal to zero, and loss is the standard loss function of
the logistic regression
loss(w, b) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yi(wTxi + b))) (5.2.3)
where m is the size of the training set of images xi with associated labels yi.
The choice of λ can have a significant effect in the performance of the algorithm
and might depend on the size of the training set. In our implementation, using
a training set of 1000 images we found experimentally that λ = 0.25 gives good
results. Figure 5.1 shows the ROC curves of the liveness test for several values of λ.
We notice that the ROC curves corresponding to λ = 0.2, 0.3 are generally higher
than the others, indicating that the algorithm performs well for values of λ in the
range [0.2, 0.3].
Following [177], we also used Matlab as our implementation platform and the
SLEP package in particular for the sparse logistic regression.
5.2.2 Experimental Design
We used images from the open access NUAA photograph imposter database, see
Section 3.2 for more details. The database was constructed using a low cost camera
and contains photos of 15 different subjects in various poses taken under different
illumination conditions. The images are organized into the two categories: the client
images which are images of live faces, and the imposter images which are images
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Figure 5.1: ROC curves for several values of λ. The algorithm performs best for
values of λ between 0.2 and 0.3.
of photos of the subjects. The size of all images is 64 × 64 and they are grayscale
encoded in RGB.
Our training dataset consisted of a total of 1000 client and imposter images. Our
test set consisted of several subsets, each one containing 105 images, i.e., seven from
each subject. More specifically, we used subsets of:
(i) client images
(ii) imposter images without any alteration
(iii) imposter images sharpened by subtracting from them the response of the
Laplacian filter
(iv) the sharpened images in (iii) blurred by a Gaussian filter with σ = 1.25
(v) four subsets of imposter images sharpened with the imsharpen Matlab func-
tion, which subtracts from the images a blurred version of it, for parameter
values of 0.5, 1.0, 1.5 and 2.0, respectively, giving different amounts of sharp-
ening
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(vi) four subsets of sharpened images blurred by a Gaussian filter with σ = 0.1,
0.5, 1.25 and 2.0, respectively
(vii) four subsets of images with different amount of salt and pepper noise at 0.01,
0.1, 0.5 and 0.9, respectively
Figure 5.2 shows typical examples of test set images.
Figure 5.2: Test images. Left to right: (i) client, (ii) imposter, (iii) sharpened
imposter, (iv) sharpened and blurred imposter, (v) imposter with salt and pepper
noise added to it.
5.3 Results
Figure 5.4 shows the ROC curves of the original liveness test and after the imposter
test images have been sharpened by subtracting from them the response of the
Laplacian filter, or processed by a Laplacian filter followed by Gaussian blurring.
We notice that, as expected, the performance of the liveness test decreases when the
imposter images have been sharpened even with the very basic sharpening algorithm
we used. On the other hand, again as expected, the performance of the liveness test
increases when the imposter images are smoothed, demonstrating that the sharpness
of the image is a key factor in distinguishing between client and imposter images by
the Tan et al. algorithm [177].
In the next experiment we want to establish that the changes in the performance
of the liveness test is commensurable with the amount of sharpening and blurring
applied to the imposter images. Figure 5.3 shows various the ROC curves when the
imposter images are sharpened using the imsharpen Matlab command. The strength
of the imsharpen command is controlled by a user defined parameter and we tried
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Figure 5.3: ROC curves for the liveness test with different amounts of sharpening
applied on the imposter images.
the values 0.5, 1.0, 1.5 and 2.0. We notice that larger amounts of sharpening on
the imposter images result into larger decreases in the performance of the liveness
test. Similarly, in Figure 5.5 we show the ROC curves when the Laplacian filter
sharpened imposter images are blurred with Gaussian filters with σ = 0.1, 0.5, 1.25
and 2.0, respectively. As expected, we notice that larger amounts of smoothing
result to larger increases in the performance of the liveness test.
Finally, we experimented with the addition of various amounts of salt and pepper
noise on the imposter images. This test is relevant in the context of liveness tests,
since in [130] it was shown that commercial face recognition systems can cope with
large amounts of salt and pepper noise but, as a consequence they are also vulnerable
to imposter image attacks even when the imposter images contain large amounts of
salt and pepper noise. Figure 5.6 shows the results when salt and pepper noise with
probabilities 0.01, 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9, respectively, was added to the imposter images.
We notice that the addition of noise increases the performance of the liveness test
and that the performance gain is commensurable with the amount of added noise.
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Figure 5.4: ROC curves for the liveness test when sharpening the imposter with the
Laplacian filter, and then blurring them. The value of λ here is 0.25, with Gaussian
blur σ = 1.25.
5.4 Conclusions
When evaluating a liveness test against imposter image attacks, the assumption
that the imposter photos are used by the attacker unprocessed is rather optimistic.
Indeed, in real life situations, we should expect that an attacker will process an
imposter photo before using it, as long as they know that would increase their
chances of successfully evading a liveness test.
Motivated by such an observation, we evaluated the resilience of a standard lu-
minance based liveness test in conjunction with certain image processing operations
on the imposter database. Our results verified and quantified the assumption that
luminance based tests rely on the different amount of sharpness between images
of live faces and imposter images. In particular, as expected, we found that the
sharpening of the imposter images decreases the accuracy of the liveness test while
smoothing or sharpening followed by smoothing increases the accuracy rates.
While we reasonably expect that by presenting a sharper printed photo in front
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Figure 5.5: ROC curves for the liveness test with different amounts of Gaussian blur
on the imposter images.
Figure 5.6: ROC curves for the liveness test with different amounts of salt and
pepper noise added to the imposter images.
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of the camera will result into a sharper image acquired by the camera, this is an
assumption that still needs to be verified. Thus, in chapter 6 we will simulate and
evaluate imposter image attacks that use processed images under realistic conditions.
That is, by printing or displaying on a tablet screen sharpened imposter images and
evaluating the resilience of the luminance based liveness test.
Chapter 6
Designing a Facial Spoofing
Database for Processed Image
Attacks
Face recognition systems are used for user authentication in everyday applications
such as logging into a laptop or smartphone without the need to memorize a pass-
word. However, they are still vulnerable to spoofing attacks, as for example when
an imposter gains access to a system by holding a printed photo of the rightful user
in front of the camera. In this chapter we are concerned with the design of face
image databases for evaluating the performance of anti-spoofing algorithms against
such attacks.
We present a new database called DURHAM FACE Database, supporting testing
against an enhancement of the standard still photo attack, in that the imposter
processes the stolen image before printing it on paper or displaying it on screen. By
testing a standard anti-spoofing algorithm on the new database we show a significant
decrease in its performance and, as a simple remedy to this problem, we propose the
inclusion of processed imposter images into the training set. Part of the research
described in this chapter has been published in [131].
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6.1 Introduction
The performance of anti-spoofing algorithms is evaluated on databases containing
both photos of real people called client images, and photos of imposters, which
essentially are photos of client images and are called imposter images. The design
of such a database is a particularly challenging task given the multiple sources of
variation in spoofing attacks. Indeed, a whole range of choices, from the choice
between a paper photo and an electronic display for the attack, to the type of paper
and printer used to print a photo, to the size of that photo and the way it is held in
front of the camera, all these factors can impact the effectiveness of the attack and
thus the perceived performance of the anti-spoofing algorithm.
The liveness test we used to evaluate the DURHAM FACE Database was pro-
posed by Tan et al. in [177]. There, they proposed several variants of the basic
algorithm and the one we chose here trains a sparse logistic regression classifier with
the difference of Gaussians of the database images. In a further improvement to
the Tan et al. algorithms, [141] apply contrast-limited adaptive histogram equaliza-
tion before computing differences of Gaussians, increasing the robustness of the test
under bad illumination conditions. Differences of Gaussians are also used in [208],
where a Support Vector Machine is trained.
The idea that a still image attack can be enhanced by digitally processing the
face image before printing it had been suggested in [132]. However, as there are
no publicly available face image databases containing processed imposter images,
i.e., designed as in Figure 6.1(C), we could not test our assumption. Instead, we
used the publicly available NUAA database, measured the performance of the live-
ness test in [177] against digitally sharpened versions of imposter images, i.e., as in
Figure 6.1(B), and argued that the drop in the performance of the liveness test is
evidence supporting our assumption.
In this chapter we address a gap in the current practice of the anti-spoofing
algorithm evaluation, namely the assumption that the attacker prints the photo of
the rightful user as it is, i.e., without attempting to process it in order to increase
the effectiveness of the attack. We created a face image database which besides the
usual imposter images it also contains imposter images obtained by photo-shooting
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printouts of sharpened client images, see Figure 6.1. We tested the database on a
standard liveness test [177], and found that the more sophisticated attack which use
processed imposter images is more likely to evade detection.
Figure 6.1: The standard database design consisting of client images (A) and im-
poster images (B), is augmented with processed imposter images (C).
Contribution: the main contribution of the chapter is the design and the construc-
tion of a database of face images for testing anti-spoofing algorithms, which, to the
best of our knowledge, is the first one based on the assumption that the imposters
may use image processing tools to enhance the effectiveness of their attack.
Limitation: as the main limitation of the chapter we note that our current database
only serves as a proof of concept, considering only one image processing operation
on the client images before they are printed. However, extending the database
with imposter images that have undergone other types of processing is a relatively
straightforward, even though laborious, process.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: In Section 6.2 we briefly discuss
the motivation behind the design of the DURHAM FACE database. A detailed
description of the database design and the parameters we considered before imple-
menting it are discussed in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4 we present the details of the
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DURHAM FACE database. In Section 6.5 we test the database by running on it a
standard liveness test and discuss the relevance of the results. A further extension
to our database is discussed in Section 6.6. Recommendations for good practices in
designing a face database for liveness test evaluation based on our experience from
our research are summarized in Section 6.7. We conclude in Section 6.8.
6.2 Motivation for Designing a New Database
The design of a database for evaluating liveness tests is a challenging task, given
the variability of form of all possible imposter attacks. An additional difficulty is
that the performance of the current state-of-the-art liveness tests seems to drop
significantly when the imposter attack deviates even slightly from the protocol that
was used to produce the imposter samples of the training set. For example, when
a different paper type is used to print imposter images, or a different printer or
electronic display, or a different camera for recapturing imposter images. A similar
problem has been observed in the behaviour of state-of-the-art algorithms for the
classic face recognition problem, where it is usually referred to as the interoperability
problem, see for example Gallbaly and Satta [60]. As a result, it is important to
have an exact description of the protocol under which a face image database was
constructed, even if that contains a number of tedious and seemingly irrelevant
details.
In Section 3.2, we reviewed some of the publicly available databases of facial
spoofing sets such as the NUAA database, which as the DURHAM FACE Database
consists of still images, and three databases containing short video sequences, which
nevertheless can also be used to evaluate still image liveness tests after extracting
frames from the video sequences. We note that none of these databases contains
images or videos produced by processed imposter images, i.e., as in Figure 6.1(C).
In real life, it is unlikely that an attacker will use unprocessed images if they know
that some simple processing will increase the effectiveness of their attack. In [131] the
resilience of a standard luminance based liveness detection test was evaluated against
processed imposter attacks. The assumption was that when imposters smoothed,
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the accuracy of the liveness test increases, while in contrast, the sharpening of
imposters decreases the accuracy of the test. The NUAA database was used to
test that assumption, but since it does not contain any processed imposters, we
just digitally smoothed and sharpened imposter images, instead of smoothing and
sharpening client images and then recapturing them.
6.3 Database Design and Parameter Fine Tuning
As already mentioned, designing a facial spoofing database is far from easy and
straightforward. There are plenty of challenging issues and parameters to be con-
sidered and controlled by the developers to achieve the optimal database behaviour.
In this section, we discuss some of the parameters we considered for our design with
a brief description of pilot tests we did for each considered parameter.
Before deciding on the choice of camera, a pilot shooting session was conducted
at the Imaging Laboratory of Durham University with 3 different cameras mounted
to tripods; a professional Canon EOS Rebel T3i (600D) with a 18-250mm lens, on
iPhone 6S mobile camera, and a commodity webcamera. Various parameters were
taken into consideration, such as illumination conditions, camera focus mechanism
(i.e., auto or manual focus), the distance between the camera lens and the object,
captured image size. Due to the large number of parameters, interactions between
them where not considered and we studied the effort of each individual parameter
separately.
Several pilots were designed to obtain a better understanding of each parameter
and take the right decisions for creating an optimally designed database. First we
had a photo-shooting session with our three available cameras, and we noticed that
when using a mobile screen for displaying client images, the produced imposter
images were slightly blurred due to being out of focus, see Figure 1.3. Thus, we
decided to evaluate two focus mechanisms; manual and auto focus.
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Figure 6.2: Client images captured by both manual and auto-focus mechanism.
Row 1: Original client images using: Left: auto-focus, Right: manual-focus. Row
2: Cropped images of Row 1. Row 3: The 2D Fourier transform of the DoG filtered
images with sigma values of: (left to right): σ = 1.0 & 2.0 and σ = 2.0 & 4.0 for
auto and manual images.
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Focus Mechanism
Before opting for using the auto-focus function of the camera we compared imposter
images captured with manual-focus and images captured with auto-focus and found
that the latter are more likely to be sharper, and thus, more challenging to classify
correctly. In Figure 6.2, a sample of two face images taken using auto and manual-
focus mechanism, are shown as well as the Fourier of the difference of Gaussians for
both images. We see that the face captured by the auto-focus mechanism has a richer
horizontal component of high frequency areas compared to the manual-focus image.
We also noticed that the auto-focus mechanism effectively prevents the capture of
very blurry out-of-focus images by blocking the shutter release.
Focus mechanism, camera type, image size and distance from camera
Table 6.1, shows some imposter images of various sizes, captured from printed papers
of different material, using a professional camera with both manual-focus and auto-
focus. To keep the size of the recapture image constant, we had to bring smaller
size images nearer to the camera, approximately 10 cm away from the lens in the
passport size case. As a result, the image was out of the depth of focus and no
photos could be taken from that of closer distances. We decided to recapture only
client images of larger size from a reasonable distance from the camera to produce
usable imposter images.
Upon the decision of working using auto-focus which is a widely available option
for the majority of commercial cameras, we next assessed the type of camera to
be used. Our three options were professional camera, mobile phone, and webcam
camera, their resolutions ranging from high to low. In the DURHAM FACE database
photo-shooting sessions photos were captured using the three considered cameras.
Figures 6.10 and 6.11 show original and face-cropped samples from the conducted
photo-shooting sessions.
Creating imposter images using paper printed or screen displayed photos can be
done either with actual size images at the same distance from the camera as the real
image was in during the creation of the client image, or smaller than the original
images size and bringing them nearer to the camera.
Thus, we conducted a follow-up brief, using the auto-focus mechanism on the
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Table 6.1: Imposters of different sizes captured on various printed paper material
by a professional camera, whether with manual-focus, or the auto-focus mechanism.
Manual-focus mechanism
A4 paper Photo paper
Passport size Medium size Full size Passport size Medium size Full size
Auto-focus mechanism
A4 paper Photo paper
Passport size Medium size Full size Passport size Medium size Full size
X X X X
X X X X
professional and mobile camera, while the web-camera is a fixed-focus camera . The
aim was to evaluate the performance of each camera on imposter and sharpened
imposter images created by using different amounts of sharpening {2.0, 4.0, 8.0
and 16.0}. Three photo-shooting sessions were conducted for each imposter and
sharpened imposter image at passport size, half-size photo size, and full-size. For
the consistency of the results, we were careful in having a uniform scale of recapture
image size, by making the distance from the camera inversely proportional to the
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size of the image. Hence, the distances of the printed or displayed client images
from the camera were one, two and four, respectively.
To evaluate the effect of the studied parameters, we are comparing the recap-
tured images using the Discrete Fourier Spectrum, and measure their complexity
by computing the `1-norm [53], see Table 6.2. The imposter image with the most
complex signal is considered the more challenging, as real images generally have
higher complexity compared to imposters, which are smoother as they lose details
when recaptured. As shown in the table, the image captured by the professional
camera at four feet distance shows the best average results.
Table 6.2: Imposters and sharpened imposters with {2.0, 4.0, 8.0 and 16.0} amount
of sharpening of different sizes {full, half, and passport} and distances from the
camera {1, 2, and 4 feet} captured by professional, mobile and web cameras.
Passport Sized Photo and 1 Foot camera distance
Professional Camera Mobile Camera Webcam
0.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 20.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 20.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 20.0
1.67 1.76 1.73 1.69 2.16 1.90 1.51 1.77 1.59 1.77 2.07 2.34 1.73 1.77 1.41 1.99 1.45 1.40
1.71 1.62 1.80 1.80 2.07 1.77 1.87 1.43 1.99 1.91 1.88 2.26 1.83 1.72 1.35 1.58 1.23 1.43
1.76 1.58 1.90 1.74 1.80 1.64 1.51 1.41 1.91 1.88 1.98 2.27 1.78 1.71 1.34 1.38 1.20 1.36
1.71 1.65 1.81 1.74 2.01 1.77 1.63 1.54 1.83 1.86 1.98 2.29 1.78 1.73 1.37 1.65 1.30 1.40
Half sized photo and 2 feet camera distance
Professional Camera Mobile Camera Webcam
0.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 20.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 20.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 20.0
1.76 1.36 1.54 1.82 1.75 2.27 1.42 1.40 1.65 1.98 1.84 1.96 1.95 1.67 1.64 1.72 1.90 1.97
1.45 1.45 1.50 1.91 2.07 2.43 1.52 1.58 1.81 1.67 2.02 2.08 1.71 1.42 1.45 1.50 1.80 1.56
1.40 1.40 1.63 0.57 2.10 2.19 1.54 1.69 1.75 1.69 1.85 2.08 1.60 1.85 1.67 1.85 1.58 1.62
1.53 1.40 1.56 1.44 1.97 2.30 1.49 1.56 1.73 1.78 1.91 2.04 1.65 1.63 1.56 1.67 1.69 1.59
Full sized photo and 4 feet camera distance
Professional Camera Mobile Camera Webcam
0.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 20.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 20.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 20.0
1.93 1.87 2.14 2.46 2.51 2.85 2.10 1.81 2.12 2.09 2.23 1.81 2.25 2.15 1.77 2.06 1.75 2.17
1.92 1.98 1.85 2.15 2.41 2.70 1.89 1.95 2.09 2.16 2.22 1.95 1.94 1.76 1.96 2.07 1.83 2.08
1.69 1.73 1.81 2.28 1.55 2.80 2.02 2.00 1.87 2.16 2.24 2.00 2.11 2.17 1.81 2.01 1.82 2.14
1.85 1.86 1.93 2.30 2.16 2.78 2.00 1.92 2.03 2.13 2.23 1.92 2.02 1.96 1.89 2.04 1.82 2.11
Illumination Conditions
Illumination is one of the most important factors to be considered when creating
a spoofing database, since differences in lightning conditions might be affecting the
properties of the images. Thus, we consider capturing client images with various
lightning conditions, including natural and artificial lights. Figure 6.3 shows an
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example of different client images for one object taken under different illumination
conditions. These photos were afterwards recaptured to produce imposters.
Figure 6.3: Sample of a pilot session for a client under controlled lightning conditions
with lights from different angels, and photos of these client images under a certain
lightning conditions where the daylight along with the room lights is illuminating
the scene. Left to right: room lights on and no additional sources of light, with
one source of light from left and room lights on, with two additional sources of light
from both right and left directions, with day light only, with one source of light
from left and day light only, and with two sources of light from both right and left
directions and day light only.
Other Parameters to Consider
Image format is also an issue to consider when designing a good database. Since our
chosen camera does not provide a variety of options, we chose the only supported
format, the JPEG become the default image format of our database. However, the
client images are cropped, they will be saved in BMP format which is a lossless
image encoding format.
Pilot
Before committing to the development of the full database, we conducted a pilot. We
used the t-test statistical method to find whether there is any statistical significance
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in the differences of the means of imposter images processed with different amounts
of sharpening, taken with a professional, mobile, and web camera.
Table 6.3: t-test: paired two sample for means.
Mobile and Professional Camera
Client Sharp 2.0 Sharp 4.0 Sharp 8.0 Sharp 10.0 Sharp 20.0
V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2
Mean 2.05 1.64 2.48 1.81 2.53 2.08 2.53 2.76 3.24 3.02 3.83 3.34
Variance 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.12
Pearson
Correlation
-0.33 -0.38 -0.03 -0.62 -0.52 -0.04
t Stat 2.60 3.68 2.60 -1.30 1.94 3.06
P(T¡=t)
two-tail
0.06 0.02 0.06 0.26 0.12 0.04
Professional and Web camera
Client Sharp 2.0 Sharp 4.0 Sharp 8.0 Sharp 10.0 Sharp 20.0
V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2
Mean 1.64 1.96 1.81 2.16 2.08 2.17 2.76 1.99 3.02 1.86 3.34 2.01
Variance 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.05
Pearson
Correlation
0.03 -0.32 0.01 -0.41 0.40 0.30
t Stat -3.82 -2.02 -0.49 3.81 9.99 8.33
P(T¡=t)
two-tail
0.02 0.11 0.65 0.02 0.00 0.00
Mobile and web camera
Client Sharp 2.0 Sharp 4.0 Sharp 8.0 Sharp 10.0 Sharp 20.0
V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2
Mean 2.05 1.96 2.48 2.16 2.53 2.17 3.00 1.99 3.24 1.86 3.83 2.01
Variance 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.05
Pearson
Correlation
-0.91 -0.36 -0.29 0.81 0.19 0.43
t Stat 0.61 4.41 4.14 21.87 11.50 19.43
P(T¡=t)
two-tail
0.58 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
The variant of the t-test we used allows the variances of the normal distributions to
be different:
t =
x1 − x2√
s21
n1
+
s22
n2
(6.3.1)
where x1 and x2 are the means of the populations, that is, the means of the absolute
values of the coefficients of the 2D Fourier transforms of the Difference of Gaussians
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from the pilot images taken by different types of cameras. The test here cover a set
of 30 images from 1 person taken by 3 different camera types. n1 and n2 are the
sizes of the groups, while s21, s
2
2 are the variances of the samples calculated using the
formula:
s21 =
∑
(x− x1)2
n1 − 1 and s
2
2 =
∑
(x− x2)2
n2 − 1 (6.3.2)
The t-test assesses the difference between the means of two groups, where a
smaller p− value means that the difference between two groups is more significant.
In our case, we use the p = 0.05 (5%) as a significance threshold. Table 6.3 clearly
shows that the DFT spectrum of imposters taken by professional and mobile cameras
in most cases is not statistically significant i.e., (p > 0.05), meaning that we can
reject the null hypothesis. Meanwhile, the p values indicate significant differences
between the webcamera on the one side and mobile and professional cameras on
the other. As a result, we used the professional camera to construct the database
since the quality of its images is comparable to the mobile phone camera and it
offers more control of the image photo-shooting process. Nevertheless, in the photo
shooting sessions we also captured client images with the mobile phone camera and
the web camera for possible later use.
6.4 DURHAM FACE Database
The DURHAM FACE Database contains face images from 21 people. All photo-
shooting sessions took place in the Imaging Laboratory of Durham University and
for each participant a total of 50 photos were taken using a professional Canon EOS
Rebel T3i (600D) with a 18-250mm lens.
Client images: The camera was mounted on a tripod and operated with the de-
fault auto-focus settings at 5, 184× 3, 456 resolution. To isolate as much as possible
the effect of the image sharpening that we applied to create the processed imposter
images, all client images were taken in a frontal view, with neutral expressions, un-
der uniform illumination and background conditions. The raw client images were
cropped down to size 640× 640, which gives a good balance between image quality
and the speed of training and testing the classifier. For our purposes, it was im-
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portant to avoid any resizing of the images, since that would mean an extra image
processing operation with a largely unpredictable and difficult to account for effect.
To achieve this, all participants were seated between 1m and 1.25m away from the
camera, at which distance it was possible to obtain tightly cropped face images of
the required 640× 640 resolution.
Imposter images: The imposter images were created from client images as shown
in Figure 6.1 (B). For each subject, an arbitrarily chosen client image, which later
would not be used for either training or testing, was printed on A4 paper using a
Ricoh 4500 Photocopier. The printed paper was pinned on a board and a series of
photos were taken with the camera's auto-focus mechanism re-enabled between any
two shots.
Figure 6.4 shows imposter images produced from small size printed images re-
captured from close distance by the camera of an iPhone 6s with non-blocking
auto-focus mechanism. When the auto-focus mechanism fails the imposter image
becomes extremely blurry, see Figure 6.4, demonstrating the importance of includ-
ing the type of camera focus mechanism in the design protocol of the database, for
example blocking auto-focus, non-blocking auto-focus, manual-focus or fixed-focus.
Figure 6.4: Imposter images captured with an iPhone 6s camera from a distance of
6cm (i) and 9cm (ii). (iii)-(iv) DoG for the images (i)-(ii) with the σ1 = 4 and σ2 =
8.
Processed imposter images: The processed imposter images were created from
the client images as shown in Figure 6.1 (B). The same arbitrarily chosen client
image used to create the imposter images was sharpened using Matlab's imsharpen
function with parameter value σ = 8.0. Then, it was printed on the Ricoh 4500
Photocopier and the same procedure that created the imposter images was followed.
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The components of the resulted database of 21 individuals are: 1,050 client images,
630 print on paper and recapture imposter images and 630 more imposter images
processed with σ = 8.0 amount of sharpening. This original database was later
extended with the capture of another 30,765 images displayed on screen, as described
in Section 6.6.
Figure 6.5: Sample from the DF photo-shooting sessions. Left: Creating client
images. Right: Creating imposter images.
Figure 6.5 shows instances of the photo-shooting session. The first column of
Figure 6.6 shows client images from the DURHAM FACE Database. The sharpened
client images in the second column, which are not part of the database, exhibit higher
contrast and some sharpening artifacts. The third column shows imposter images
from the database; they are more blurry than the client images. Finally, the fourth
column shows sharpened imposter images from the database, which show the highest
visual similarity with the client images. Indeed, the direct digital sharpening with
Matlab's imsharpen followed by a procedural blurring by printing them on a paper
and recapturing them, seems to be a great extent to cancel each other.
6.5 Testing
We tested the DURHAM FACE Database by running on it the well-known liveness
test proposed in [177], which is conceptually simple and easy to implement. While
testing with various liveness tests would have given us a better understanding of the
behaviour of the database, we note that the fundamental nature of the mathematical
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Figure 6.6: Samples from the DURHAM FACE Database for three different subjects.
Left to right: a client image; a sharpened client image; an imposter (recaptured)
image of the client image; an imposter of the sharpened client.
and statistical tools employed by that test, namely differences of Gaussians of images
and sparse logistic regression, make it a suitable choice as a representative liveness
test. The detailed description of the test can be found in Section 5.2.1.
In all tests, the standard deviations of the differences of Gaussians were set at
σ1 = 4 and σ2 = 8. The results are shown in Figure 6.7. Each diagram consists
of two ROC curves, one showing the performance of the classifier in distinguishing
between client and imposter images and the other in distinguishing between client
and sharpened imposter images. The four diagrams correspond to four different
designs of the training set which may contain:
(i) client and imposter images from all 21 subjects,
(ii) client and sharpened imposter images from all 21 subjects,
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Figure 6.7: In each diagram the two ROC curves show the performance of the
algorithm in distinguishing between client images and imposter or sharpened im-
poster images, respectively. (i)-(iii) The training set consists of client images and:
(i) top-left: imposter images, (ii) top-right: sharpened imposter images, (iiii)
bottom-left both imposter and sharpened imposter images, from all 21 subjects.
(iv) bottom-right The training set consists of client and imposter images of 15
subjects, while images from the other 6 subjects are used for testing.
6.5. Testing 108
(iii) client, imposter and sharpened imposter images from all 21 subjects,
(iv) client and imposter images from 15 of the subjects, while the test set contains
images from the other 6 subjects.
Since client images have always to be included in the training set, Figures 6.7(i)-
(iii) cover all three cases regarding the content of the training set: imposter images,
sharpened imposter images, or both. Figure 6.7(i) verifies our main hypothesis,
showing that the performance of the liveness test decreases considerably when the
attacker uses sharpened imposter images. Indeed, the large gap between the two
curves indicates a significant drop in the performance of the liveness test, which is
largely due to the fact that the classifier was trained to distinguish between client
and imposter images and not between client and sharpened imposter images. This
can be seen in Figure 6.7(ii), where the classifier is trained to distinguish between
client and sharpened imposter images and as a result the liveness test is much
more efficient against attacks with such images. In Figure 6.7(iii), the classifier
is trained to distinguish between client images and imposters of both types and
we notice that its discriminative ability decreases slightly only against attack with
sharpened imposter images. This was again an expected result, since the level
of similarity between sharpened imposter rather than common imposter images,
and client images is higher than the level of similarity between client and imposter
images, as it is clear in Figure 6.6, distinguishing between sharpened imposter and
client images is a harder task when no task, is given preferential treatment during
training.
From the results in Figures 6.7(i)-(iii) we conclude that by sharpening the client
image before printing and recapturing it to create imposter images, attackers can
significantly increase their chances of evading the Tan et al. liveness test. On
the other hand, a very simple and largely effective countermeasure is to train the
classifier not only with imposter but with sharpened imposter images too. In that
case, there is only a slight decrease in the performance of the classifier on sharpened
rather than common imposters, which can be explained by the higher similarity
between client and sharpened imposter images, which makes the distinction between
these two classes an intrinsically more difficult task.
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Figure 6.7(iv) shows the results when the classifier is trained with a cross-subject
independent set of client and imposter images. That is, the subjects are partitioned
into two non-overlapping subsets and images from the first subset are used for train-
ing while images from the second subset are used for testing. We notice that the
cross-subject independence is a strong assumption which is not used in the relevant
literature since liveness tests usually run in parallel to face recognition systems and
a positive classification of a subject by a face recognition system implies the presence
of their images in the database. Nevertheless, Figure 6.7(iv) shows that even with
the assumption of cross-subject independence, our claim that imposter attacks with
sharpened images are more effective than common imposter attacks is valid.
6.5.1 Printer Image Processing
Apart from pointing out that the strength of malicious presentation attacks can
be underestimated if image processing operations before image printing are not
considered, the above results are also relevant in the setting of the common imposter
attacks via the advanced and largely automatic image processing functionality of
modern printers and cameras. As most printers and cameras make use of proprietary
image processing technology, the study of the effect of printer and printer settings
on the performance of the liveness test is very challenging.
Figure 6.8 illustrates the effect of printer choice through an example. Indeed,
visual inspection of the printouts of the same digital image by two different printers
reveals significant differences and as a result the differences of Gaussians of the two
images are also significantly different. From each of the two printouts we created
10 imposter images and computed the probabilities of the image to be imposter,
using the same classifier as in Figure 6.8(i). When the Ricoh 4500 printout was
used, that is, the printer that created the printouts for the imposter images of the
training set, the average probability was 0.929. On the other hand, when Bizhub
c654e printer was used the average probability dropped sharply to 0.083. Thus,
the example indicates that the choice of printer and printer settings can affect the
performance of the liveness test and perhaps, in agreement with what we found in
our main experiment, using a variety of printers and printer settings to create the
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training set, can increase the generality of the classifier.
Figure 6.8: (i)-(ii) imposter images from printouts by Ricoh 4500 and Bizhub c654e,
respectively. (iii)-(iv) the corresponding differences of Gaussians for σ = 4 and
σ2 = 8.
6.6 Database Extension
The DURHAM FACE database was expanded to include images of various imposters
displayed on digital screens, besides the real client images and images of imposters
and sharpened imposters printed on a piece of A4 paper of the original database.
Imposters were created by playing in front of the camera a video clip at a frame rate
of 60 fps, showing sharpened imposter images at various amounts of sharpening:
0.0, 2.0, 4.0, 8.0 and 16.0. We used a Toshiba Ultra laptop's digital screen, under
uniform lightning conditions, with the brightness of the display set to maximum.
The same professional camera, the Canon EOS Rebel T3i (600D) with a 18-250mm
lens, was used, mounted to a tripod, to capture the video clip. Figure 6.9 presents
samples of imposters on the digital display, with different amounts of sharpening.
Our extended database contains a total of 30,765 imposter images recaptured from
clients shown on a digital display, all at a resolution of 320 x 320. We chose 5
random clients from each of the 21 subjects in the database, and then, the images
were sharpened before being played in-front of the professional camera as an MS
Power Point slide show, with a fixed 2-second automatic timer for slide moving. As
a result, 300 frames for each individual were produced before some frames around
each slide transition were removed. Hence, approximately a total of 293 frames of
each type of processed imposters were produced for each subject. The images were
cropped and classified accordingly.
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This extension to the DURHAM FACE database, was used in Chapter 8, where the
need for a larger dataset became clearer, as we wanted to evaluate an approach based
on a pre-trained Convolutional Neural Network against various processed imposter
image attacks.
6.7 Good Practices in Database Design
To optimise the design of a facial spoofing database to be used in the evaluation of
liveness tests, we recommend good practices.
1. The camera: there are hundreds or thousands of types of digital cameras,
each one with a different set of features that might lead to significant differences
in the properties of the captured images. Hence, considering as many camera
types as possible is one of the keys towards a good database design.
2. Focus mechanism: cameras can operate either on manual-focus, fixed-focus,
or auto-focus. In the manual-focus, the photographer is responsible for setting
up the focus mechanism's options, in which case their expertise plays major
role in achieving the best settings. Fixed-focus is the least used mechanism
in high end cameras, but still used in webcameras. In this case we expect to
have imposter images with less sharp features if we use a smaller than natural
size printed image and bring near to the camera to compensate. That could
seriously affect the quality of the database as imposter images would simple
be blurry out of focus images. Auto-focus is the most widely used option in
most modern cameras. For some various reasons, the auto-focus mechanism
might encounter problems and focus could go wrong. This might create a few
problematic imposter images within the database.
3. Camera hold: the camera can be either in a fixed position or hand-held. Most
images available on social media are taken by devices being held rather than,
for example, being mounted to tripods. As a result, these images might often
be slightly blurry due to the mini-scale camera shakes during photo-shooting.
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Figure 6.9: Samples from the DURHAM FACE Database of imposters from a digital
display, of five different subjects and with different sharpening values. Left to right:
different sharpening amounts have been applied to imposter images; 0.0, 2.0, 4.0,
8.0, and 16.0.
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Figure 6.10: Samples from the original photo sessions for the DURHAM FACE
Database of five different subjects taken with different cameras. Left to right:
professional camera, mobile phone and webcamera.
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Figure 6.11: Samples from the DURHAM FACE Database of five different subjects
taken with different cameras, after cropping. Left to right: professional camera,
mobile phone and webcamera.
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4. Object size and distance: from the camera producing an imposter image
from a real client image is a complex task, requiring printing the client images
on a paper or displaying them on a digital display and setting them up for a
photo-shooting session after finding an appropriate for the size of the image
distance from the camera. Having objects too faraway or very close to the
camera will result in imposters of poor quality. Therefore, a detailed study of
appropriate image size and distance from the camera must be undergone prior
to the creation of the database.
5. Printer ink and paper: printed images may vary duo to ink quality varia-
tions, while the type, colour and the quality of the paper also plays a significant
role in the appearance of the printed image.
6. Digital display brightness: a potentially important factor when presenting
an imposter on a digital screen, as incorrect brightness levels can lead to
imposter images being altered in undesired ways.
6.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented the DURHAM FACE Database, a new publicly avail-
able face image database for testing anti-spoofing algorithms. The main novelty
in its design is the inclusion of processed imposter images, justified under the as-
sumption that attackers can easily process the client images before printing them
for presentation attacks, and in particular, they may sharpen them in order to coun-
teract the blurring induced by the printing and recapturing process. Our tests show
a significant decrease in the performance of a standard liveness when sharpened im-
poster images are used, however, most of the performance loss can be restored by
the simple measure of including sharpened imposter images in the training set.
In the future we plan to extend the database with more types of processed im-
poster images. In particular, instead of processing the client images with existing,
simple or sophisticated, image processing operations, we would like to reverse engi-
neer the process and thus, be able to directly compute images which under printing
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and recapturing produce imposter images that are as close as possible to the the
original client images.
Chapter 7
Signal-Noise Analysis of Face
Anti-spoofing Algorithms
In this chapter we study the performance of two face anti spoofing algorithms;
the Tan et al. and a tailor made ANN based algorithm, under the assumption
that the attacker applies digital image processing operations on a face image before
using it for the spoofing attack. We treat the main variable of the image sharpening
algorithm as parameter and capture the behaviour of the algorithm's performance in
terms of this single parameter by a statistical model of its signal noise decomposition,
rather than by computing ROC curves. In particular, we propose beta distribution
models for both the signal and the noise and show how the sharpening of the image
used for the attack affects the parameters of these beta distributions.
7.1 Introduction
Face recognition is a prime candidate technique in biometric identification applica-
tions requiring real-time, reliable and unobtrusive user authentication without the
use of specialized hardware. On the other hand, it is also considered vulnerable to
spoofing attacks, in the form, for example, of imposters gaining access to the system
by holding in front of the camera a stolen image of the user. This vulnerability
means that user authentication through face recognition is still mostly confined to
applications with low security requirements, such as low security level mobile phone
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log-in, or applications in highly controlled environments, such as airports.
Liveness tests are countermeasures to spoofing attacks. One limitation shared
by the majority of the current approaches to the development of liveness tests is
the tacit assumption that the imposter will use the stolen image or video as it is,
i.e., without previously processing it in order to increase the effectiveness of the
attack. Moreover, this tacit assumption is carried over from the development to the
evaluation of liveness tests. Thus, the most popular image and video databases for
evaluating liveness tests, such as the NUAA [177], PRINT-ATTACK [14], REPLAY-
ATTACK [33] and CASIA [208] consist of imposter images or videos captured from
unprocessed photographs or videos of the users. The DURHAM FACE database
[131] contains processed imposter images, but it is considerably smaller than the
previous ones.
The processed image imposter attack was proposed in [132] and tested with di-
rect sharpening of imposter images from the NUAA database. Our testing approach
was further validated in [131] with the creation of the DURHAM FACE database
containing sharpened imposter images produced as photographs of printed sharp-
ened client images. Here, we use for our evaluation two liveness tests, a classic one
based on a Sparse Logistic Regression (SLR) classifier applied on a differences of
Gaussians (DoG) feature space, and one that is tailored-made for the purposes of
this chapter, based on Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) applied on raw images.
SLR was chosen as a mathematically well understood technique with predictable
behaviour. It is considered as a baseline machine learning technique which performs
robustly in this type of problems. Moreover, Lambert's cosine Law can be used
to justify the ability of DoG in distinguishing between the light reflections from
real faces and recaptured images [177]. On the other hand, ANN was chosen as
a generic machine learning algorithm, without any distinct feature extraction step
based on assumptions about the optics of the problem. The use of convolutional
neural networks as in [201] and [107] was also considered. However, this promising
research direction seems at the moment to be hampered by a lack of face anti-
spoofing specific data for CNN training. And thus, we first opted for a simpler ANN
based generic algorithm which was sufficient for our purposes.
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We aim at a better understanding of the behaviour of liveness tests against pro-
cessed imposter image attacks, employing a more detailed statistical modeling of the
output of the classifiers, beyond the plotting of empirical ROC curves. In particular,
for each instance of the attack, corresponding to a specific value of the main param-
eter of the image sharpening function, we model the output of the classifier on the
client and the imposter images with two beta distributions, and study the relation
between the sharpening parameter and the parameters of the beta distribution. For
example, if we train the SLR classifier with target values of 0 for imposters and
1 for client images, then, by increasing the amount of sharpening of the imposter
images, the imposter beta distribution sometimes becomes bimodal, i.e., the middle
values of the classifier's output on imposter images are pushed towards the ends
of the support [0,1]. The direct consequence for an attacker aiming at maximizing
the effectiveness of their attack is that against a strict system operating at the left
hand end of the ROC curve, sharpened imposter images will be more effective, while
against loose systems operating at the right hand end of the ROC curve will be less
effective.
Perhaps, the most appropriate framework for presenting our approach is the one
provided by the signal detection theory [118], with the classifier's output on clients
being the signal and its output on imposters being the noise. From the signal
detection point of view, the sharpening of the imposter images decreases the mean
and increases the variance of the distribution of the noise, producing two effects
that act in opposite directions. On the one hand, the decrease in their mean value
moves imposters further apart from clients and thus, makes them easier to detect,
while the increased variance blends them more with the clients, making them more
difficult to detect.
Contributions: The main contributions of the chapter are: (i) The use of a signal-
noise decomposition model based on beta distributions for studying the behavior of
liveness tests under processed image attacks with the amount of sharpening treated
as a parameter. (ii) An evaluation of this model, both with a classic liveness test
and with a tailor-made one, aiming at exhibiting the variety encountered in the
behaviour of different liveness tests under simple image processing operations.
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Limitation: The main limitation of the chapter is that following [132] we evaluate
our approach indirectly, that is by direct processing of the imposter images, instead
of processing client images, printing them and taking photos of them, which will
then be used to produce imposter images. However, we note that the validity of this
indirect approach has already been verified in [131]. Moreover, it is based on the
very reasonable assumption that if a digital image is sharper than another, then it
will most likely remain the sharper one after both images are printed on paper and
recaptured on a camera.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2 we describe the
two liveness tests we use and the methodology for analyzing their effectiveness under
processed image attacks. In Section 7.3 we present and discuss the results and we
briefly conclude in Section 7.4.
7.2 Method
The imposter images are processed with Matlab's imsharpen function, using various
values of the function's main parameter which controls the amount of sharpening.
Next, each set of sharpened imposter images, together with the set of client images
is used to test two different anti-spoofing algorithms. Finally, the outputs of these
algorithms are analyzed with a signal-noise decomposition method, that is, by fitting
two beta distributions on the outputs of the classifier, one on the imposters and one
on the clients, respectively.
Notice that imsharpen retains visual facial information well and we do not expect
problems with the face recognition part of the system, even for large values of the
main parameter, see Figure 7.1
7.2.1 Anti-spoofing Algorithms
The first classifier we use is based on sparse logistic regression (SLR) for the machine
learning part, in conjunction with differences of Gaussians for feature extraction. It
was proposed in Tan et al. [177] and became a popular choice for evaluating al-
gorithms and databases [116, 208], not only because it is easy to implement, but
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Figure 7.1: Left to right: Client, imposter and imposter sharpened by 1.0, 5.0 and
50.0, respectively.
also because the employed techniques, i.e., logistic regression and Gaussian smooth-
ing, are mathematically well understood and as a result have, generally, predictable
behaviour.
Here, we set the standard deviations for the difference of Gaussians to σ1 = 0.5
and σ2 = 1.0 and use a value of λ = 0.05 as our regularization constant. For an
input test image x, the output of the trained sparse logistic regression model is:
1
1 + exp(wTx+ b)
(7.2.1)
where w is the weight vector, and b the intercept value. The output can be inter-
preted as the posterior probability of the image x to be a client.
The second anti-spoofing algorithm we use is an Artificial Neural Network (ANN),
trained on the raw images of the database. To the best of our knowledge, shallow
ANNs have not been used before in this specific setting but, nevertheless, in our
experiments they performed better than SLR. Given the high dimensionality of the
data compared to the size of the database, we opted for a very simple design con-
sisting of a single hidden layer with 10 nodes, the number of which was chosen after
extensive trial and error experimentation. The hidden layer transfer functions were
tan-sigmoids and the output transfer function log-sigmoids, and thus, the output
values were again in the range [0,1]. For training our dataset D, we use one of the
most popular simple in terms of theoretical analysis algorithms, the scaled conjugate
gradient-descent (SGD). Specifically, we used the TRAINSGD from Matlab's nntool
with the default parameters of λ = 10−7 and σ = 10−5. The loss function was:
loss(D) ∆=
1
N
N∑
i=1
l(X(i), y(i)) (7.2.2)
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where,
l(X(i), y(i)) = |y(i) − yˆ(i)|2 (7.2.3)
where y(i) ∈ {0, 1} is the label of sample X(i) and yˆ(i) is the value returned by the
ANN on input X(i).
The stopping criteria were again the Matlab's default, that is, terminate when the
magnitude of the gradient becomes smaller than = 10−6, or 6 consecutive validation
checks show no improvement. Typically, the algorithm was terminating after about
50 epochs. In testing the two classifiers we applied both cross-subject and within-
subject training. The cross-subject training set consisted of 3,118 clients and 5,293
imposters from 9 subjects, while the test set consisted of 1,367 clients and an equal
number of imposters from 6 subjects. The within-subject training and test sets each
consisted of 1,000 client images and an equal number of imposters from 15 subjects.
In all cases we used the 64× 64 grayscale images of the NUAA database.
In all cases the input of the ANNs were the raw image data. We experimented
with various extracted image features, such as differences of Gaussians for inputs,
but there were no improvements in the results.
7.2.2 Signal-Noise Decomposition
In the face anti-spoofing literature, the most common way to evaluate the perfor-
mance of classifiers is by plotting the empirical ROC curves. In our case, ROC
curves corresponding to different amounts of sharpening generally intersect. In fact,
in some cases the whole family of ROC curves seems to pass from a single point.
While there is nothing unusual in that behavior, it suggests that we might get fur-
ther insights into the performance of the classifiers by studying the signal noise
decomposition of their outputs.
Following standard signal detection terminology, we call the output of the classi-
fier on imposter images noise, and the output on client images signal. The classifier's
output on the imposter test set is a sample of the noise and it is modeled with a beta
distribution Beta(αn, βs). Similarly, the classifier's output on the client test set is
a sample of the signal, modeled with another beta distribution Beta(αs, βs). Here,
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the parameters of the beta distribution are computed with the maximum likelihood
method, using Matlab's betafit function.
We note that the distributions of the noise and the signal contain more informa-
tion than the ROC curve alone. Indeed, from the distributions Pn(t) and Ps(t) of
the signal and the noise, which in our case both have support [0,1], we can obtain
all the points of the ROC curve
(x(t0), y(t0)), 0 ≤ t0 ≤ 1
as,
x(t0) =
∫ 1
t0
Pn(t)dt y(t0) =
∫ 1
t0
Ps(t)dt (7.2.4)
while, generally, from the ROC curve we can not retrieve the two distributions.
We also note that the use of the beta distribution for modeling the output of
binary classifiers is very common in the literature. For example, [158] uses beta dis-
tributions to model the performance of a face recognition algorithm under repeated
trials on the same user. In the relevant literature, the reasons most often cited for
the choice of a beta distribution are, firstly, that its support is, conveniently, the in-
terval [0,1], and secondly, that it is the conjugate prior of the binomial distribution,
i.e., the distribution expected from a Bernoulli trial.
A simpler alternative to the modeling of the signal and noise samples with beta
distributions would have been to study the behavior of a distance function between
the two samples, in which case, distance minimization could then be used by the
attacker as a strategy for choosing an optimal amount of sharpening. However,
regardless of the choice of distance function, this simpler approach fails to describe
the effect of sharpening as a trade-off between the maximization of true positives
and the minimization of false positives.
Table 7.1 shows the Hellinger distance
(1−
20∑
i=1
(him(i) · hcl(i))1/2)1/2 (7.2.5)
between the twenty-bin histograms of the classifiers'outputs. We notice that apart
from cross-subject SLR, in all other cases the distance function indicates that small
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Table 7.1: Hellinger distances between the twenty-bin histograms of the client and
imposter outputs.
sharp 0 sharp 1 sharp 5 sharp 50
SLR cross 0.4633 0.3959 0.2763 0.2399
SLR within 0.8242 0.8307 0.8542 0.8303
ANN cross 0.6635 0.6641 0.6482 0.6496
ANN within 0.8929 0.8976 0.8941 0.8093
amounts of sharpening slightly weaken the attack. The reason for this counter-
intuitive result is that sharpening makes some of the large output values of these
classifiers, which for any reasonable choice of threshold would have anyway been
classified as clients, even larger.
7.3 Results
Figure 7.2 shows the ROC curves of the two anti-spoofing algorithms under cross-
subject and within-subject training for various amounts of sharpening. In most
cases, and especially in the cases of within-subject training, visual inspection is
not particularly revealing since all the curves approach quickly the top left of the
ROC box. The only exception is the SLR classifier under cross-subject training
where it is clear that the sharpened image ROC curves are lower until around a 0.4
value for the false positive rate and then climb higher, see Figure 7.2 (left). That
behavior suggests that a sharpened imposter image attack should be used against
strict security systems operating at the left end of the ROC curve and be avoided
against loose systems operating at the right end of the ROC curve. The shape of
the ROC curves in Figure 7.2 (left) also suggests that the use of the area-under-the-
curve metric, which has the disadvantage of not making the distinction between the
left and the right end of a ROC curve, is not suitable here.
Figure 7.3 shows the twenty-bin histograms of the outputs of the classifiers for
client, imposter and sharpened imposter images. We notice that several of the his-
tograms are U-shaped or J-shaped and that the effect of sharpening on the imposter
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Figure 7.2: Top-left: SLR cross-subject, top-right: SLR within-subject, bottom-
left: ANN cross-subject, and bottom-right: ANN within-subject.
images can be described in a simple and intuitive way as pushing the output values
away from the middle and towards the ends of the range [0,1]. The variation in the
shapes of the histograms suggests the use of a two-parameter probability distribu-
tion for modelling. Moreover, it shows that the simpler alternative very often used
in practice, namely, estimating the empirical mean and variance of the samples, is
not suitable here. For a comprehensive discussion of the limitations of ROC curve,
see [66]. Indeed, depending on whether the shape of the initial imposter histogram
is unimodal or bimodal, pushing the mid-values towards the two ends of the range
may increase or decrease the mean and may increase or decrease the variance. Thus,
while a beta distribution is completely defined by its mean and variance, the mean
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Table 7.2: Maximum likelihood values estimated for α and β.
SLR cross SLR within ANN cross ANN within
α β α β α β α β
client 0.4704 0.3641 3.2738 0.6726 0.6173 0.2763 1.4747 0.2902
sharp 0 0.7752 1.9158 0.7111 5.0419 0.1879 1.6616 0.2471 17.5246
sharp 1 0.59 1.3654 0.5762 5.3962 0.1852 1.6336 0.2388 17.8584
sharp 5 0.3469 0.7048 0.3099 4.2685 0.1756 1.3805 0.2166 14.2596
sharp 50 0.2207 0.3987 0.1375 1.3993 0.1416 1.1215 0.1719 1.791
and the variance by their own, without any assumption about the distribution, do
not provide sufficient information.
Table 7.2 shows the (α, β) values of the beta distributions of the same data as
in Figure 7.4. The corresponding beta distribution plots are shown in Figure 7.4.
Assuming that α 6= β, the mode of the beta distribution, for example, whether it is
bell-shaped, J-shaped or U-shaped, depends on whether α and β are smaller, equal
or greater than 1, see for example [135].
For imposters and sharpened imposters, we notice that α is always less than
1 and decreases with sharpening, while β in most cases is greater than 1, giving
J-shaped imposter distributions. The notable exception is the cross-subject SLR for
the two larger amounts of sharpening where β is less than 1 and the distribution
becomes bimodal, indicating a significant number of false positives even on very
strict operating thresholds. In all other cases, the sharpened imposter distributions
remain J-shaped with a right hand tail, however, their tail increases with sharpening,
bringing them closer to a U-shaped distribution. The larger tail is also noticeable
in the histograms in Figure 7.4.
Regarding the client distributions, we notice that the cross-subject client dis-
tributions are U-shaped for both classifiers while the within-subject are J-shaped,
indicating a qualitatively significant difference in the measured performance be-
tween cross-subject and within-subject training, with within-subject corresponding
of course to an easier classification problem.
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7.4 Conclusions
Recent research has developed face anti-spoofing algorithms of increased robustness,
however, coping with the variability of the conditions and the variability of the
possible attacks remains a serious challenge. While this variability challenge is
reflected in the ways the benchmark databases are designed and the anti-spoofing
algorithms are evaluated, still, database and test set variability has a categorical
rather than a parametric form. That is, while the databases and the test sets
extracted from them consist of several subsets with varying properties, these subsets
do not correspond in any systematic way to different values of a parameter. In this
chapter, we tested one standard and one tailor made face anti spoofing algorithm in
a parametrized setting, the parameter being the amount by which imposter images
are sharpened. We discussed the methodological challenges related to parametric
testing and we showed that beta distribution modelling of the client and the imposter
test sets gives a novel insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the anti-spoofing
algorithms.
In the future, we would like to create a parametrized database for testing anti-
spoofing algorithms, with the parameter being related either to attack variability,
such as the amount of sharpening of the imposter images, or to conditions variability,
such as the lighting of the scene.
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Figure 7.3: Left to Right: Twenty-bin histograms of clients, imposters and im-
posters sharpened by 1.0, 5.0 and 50.0, respectively. Top to Bottom: Cross-subject
SLR, within-subject SLR, cross-subject ANN and within-subject ANN.
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Figure 7.4: Beta distributions fitted to the output values of the trained classi-
fiers. Top-left: Cross-subject SLR. Top-right: within-subject SLR. Bottom-left:
cross-subject ANN. Bottom-right: within-subject ANN.
Chapter 8
Transfer Learning for Face
Liveness Detection
In this chapter we study face liveness detection through a relatively new machine
learning technique, that is, transfer learning pre-trained Convolutional Neural Net-
works. We employ one of the most popular in computer vision applications pre-
trained CNNs, the VGG-16, and use it on the client/imposter classification prob-
lem of face anti-spoofing. Our aim is to increase the robustness of liveness tests
against malicious attacks using imposter images pre-processed by various amounts
of sharpening. We evaluate the proposed classifier against our own DURHAM FACE
database, described in Chapter 6, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the only
one containing sharpened imposter images.
The main contribution of this chapter is a demonstration that a classifier based on
the VGG-16 can increase considerably the accuracy of liveness testing, even against
attacks with pre-processed imposter images. We also verify that even against liveness
tests based on more sophisticated machine learning techniques, such as transfer
learning a pre-trained CNNs, the use of sharpened imposter images increases the
effectiveness of the attack.
The main limitation of this chapter is the relatively limited scope of the experi-
ment and thus, the preliminary nature of the presented results. We use a relatively
small database, CPU rather than GPU computation, and compute accuracy rates
rather than ROC curves parameterised by a threshold value.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 8.1 presents a brief review
of transfer learning and a high level description the architecture of the VGG-16. The
classifier and the design of the experiment are described in Section 8.2. The results
are presented in Section 8.3 and finally, the conclusions and our intended future
work are discussed in Section 8.4.
8.1 Convolutional Neural Networks
The use of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been significantly increased in many
domains. These methods are learning methods with multi-levels of representations
along the neurons in the network. The Convolutional Neural Network is a class of
the DNNs and is normally suitable for analysing visual images.
8.1.1 Transfer Learning
Most machine learning algorithms work under the assumption that the training
and test sets are drawn from the same feature space and are two samples of the
same distribution. As a result, if for some reason we have to assume that this
distribution has changed, then the entire statistical model needs to be updated and
the classifier to be rebuilt from scratch, using a new training set. Sometimes this
can be impossible, or too costly. For example it can be impossible, or very time
consuming to collect new training set, or too computationally expensive to train
the model. In practice, especially for high-end machine learning algorithms such
as deep CNN, it was been found possible to train a classifier using a training set
from one domain and then use it for a classification task in another domain. This
technique is known as Knowledge transfer or Transfer learning, which when used
successfully increases the applicability of machine learning, improves its performance
and decreases its cost, reducing for example the need for costly manual labelling
[140, 206]. In applications, transfer learning is most often used when there are not
enough data to train a model from scratch, or when we want to save computational
resources at the training stage.
There are two main approaches to transfer learning. In the first approach, we
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use the pre-trained model as a feature extractor, with the output of a chosen layer of
the pre-trained model being the input of a usually simpler model, which is trained
specifically for the new task [149]. The second approach is to fine-tune for the
new task the whole of the pre-trained model, or just part of it, using for example
backpropagation to adjust the initial weights.
There are few works on face liveness detection using the CNNs. Yang et al. [201]
was the first to propose the use of transfer learning based on a CNN for face anti-
spoofing. The authors proposed the use of a well-known pre-trained CNN, the
AlexNet [99], for feature extraction, and then used an SVM for classification. Their
method was tested on the REPLAY-ATTACK database and the in their best case
scenario the HTER was 2.81%.
Menotti et al. [125] proposed an approach that uses fine-tuning on the CifarNet
pre-trained CNN for various anti-spoofing tasks. Their method resulted on an HTER
of 0.76% and 0.00% when used on the REPLAY-ATTACK and 3DMAD databases,
respectively.
Lucena et al. [115] proposed a face anti-spoofing approach, called the FastNet. It
is based on the architecture of the VGG-16, except for the top layers where authors
removed one of the fully connected layers and modified the size of the other two
to 256 and 1, respectively. The proposed model resulted on the accuracy rate of
99.04% and an HTER of 1.20% when tested on the REPLAY-ATTACK database,
while it achieved a 100% accuracy rate and an HTER of 0.00% when it was tested
on the 3DMAD database.
8.1.2 VGG
Today, CNNs are considered the state-of-the-art in solving computer vision problems
of various levels of complexity. VGG, also known as OxfordNet, is a very deep neural
network trained on ImageNet, which has 15 million high-resolution images collected
from the web and labeled by human labelers using Amazons Mechanical Turk crowd-
sourcing application. These images are classified into 1000 classes and approximately
22,000 categories. The VGG team secured the first and the second places in the
localization and classification tasks of the ImageNet ILSVRC-2014 [153].
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Figure 8.1: The VGG-16 Architecture.
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VGG was developed in order to investigate how does the depth of a CNN affects
its accuracy in the setting of large scale image recognition. The two standard im-
plementations have a depth of 16 and 19 weight layers, giving the VGG-16 and the
VGG-19, respectively [161].
VGG-16 Architecture
As shown in Figure 8.1, the VGG is a 2D CNN with 16 convolutional layers organised
in 5 blocks. After multiple filtering operations are performed, the initial 224×224×3
RGB image is transformed into a 224 × 224 × 64 array in the first block, a 112 ×
112× 128 in the second, 56× 56× 256 in the third, 28× 28× 512 in the fourth and
14 × 14 × 512 in the fifth. At each convolutional layer, all filtering kernels are of
size 3 × 3. The Max-pooling is performed over 2 × 2 pixel windows, with stride 2.
The activation function for all hidden layers is the rectifier linear unit (ReLU). At
the top of the VGG-16 architecture there are three fully connected layers. The size
of the first two layers is 4096 and the size of the last is 1000 [153].
8.2 Experimental Design
In this research, we are using the VGG-16 pre-trained Convolutional Neural Net-
work. The implementation of the algorithm was done in Matlab using the Neural
Network Toolbox model and the VGG-16 Network support package in particular.
For training and testing we used the DURHAM FACE database. The only one pre-
processing step we did was the down-sampling the database images to a fixed size
of 224 × 224, which is the standard input of VGG-16. Since the DURHAM FACE
database consists of square images, no further cropping was required, and we did
not process the images in any other way.
The transfer learning was conducted as follows; first, the raw images of the
DURHAM FACE database were processed by the VGG-16 and the values of the
second fully-connected layer (fc7) were obtained. They were used as a feature vector
to train an SVM. In our implementations we used Matlab's fitcecoc function to train
a binary SVM using the default parameters.
In some of our experiments, the imposter class was containing unprocessed im-
8.3. Results 135
posters only, while in some other experiments it was containing sharpened imposters
as well. In some pilot tests we trained a multi-class SVM, with the imposter class
split into 5 different classes, depending on the amount of sharpening the imposters
had received, but since the results were poor we dropped that idea.
We run both within-subject and cross-subject validation experiments. As DF
database is a relatively small database containing face images from 21 individuals,
we used images from all the 21 subjects in the within-subject training and test sets,
while images from 15 individuals were used as the cross-subject training set and
images from the remaining 6 individuals as the test set. In total we conducted four
separate experiments using both within-subject and cross-subject protocols:
 Within-subject:
We train with 788 client images and the same number of plain imposter
images. We use 262 images from each of the 6 labels for testing.
We train with 750 client images and 788 images from each of the 5 imposter
labels. We test with 262 images from each of the 6 labels.
 Cross-subject:
We train with 750 client images and the same number of plain imposter
images. We use 300 images from each of the 6 labels for testing.
We train with 750 client images and 750 images from each imposter label.
We test with 300 images from each of the 6 labels.
8.3 Results
In Table 8.1, we report the accuracy rates for the various experiments evaluating the
proposed algorithm based on the pre-trained VGG-16 as feature extractor and an
SVM as classifier. We run four experiment, depending on whether the experimental
design of training and testing is cross-subject or within-subject, and whether we
used sharpened imposters for training. Notice that while the accuracy rates for the
detection of an imposter are presented separately, in five different classes, it is still
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a binary classification problem, that is, there are only two classes for training and
testing, clients and imposters.
First, we notice that the proposed deep learning approach resulted in a consid-
erably better performance than the previous approaches we presented in this thesis;
the logistic regression and the shallow neural networks in particular. In the case
of within subject validation in particular, the accuracy rates reached in most cases
100%. On the other hand, as expected, the cross subject setting poses a more chal-
lenging classification problem, in which case the use of a training set containing
sharpened imposter images seems to be critical. Indeed, with cross-subject valida-
tion and training with imposter images only, the accuracy rates of the deep learning
approach can be just slightly above 90% in some cases, and in the case of imposters
sharpened by 8.0 the rate dips below 90%. In contrast, when we train with sharpened
imposters too, the accuracy rates remains in most cases at 100%.
Prior to the main experiment, we conducted a pilot test in which we trained
the SVM on six classes: client, sharp 0.0, 2.0, 4.0, 8.0 and 16.0. We noticed that
training on these six classes resulted into a less robust liveness test. The accuracy
rates for the cross-subject validation design were 93.33%, 76.67%, 36.67%, 60.00%,
83.33%, and 90.00% for client, sharp 0.0, 2.0, 4.0, 8.0, and 16.0, respectively, while
in the within-subject validation design the accuracy rates from the same experiment
were 95.24%, 95.24%, 90.48%, 100.00%, 100.00%, and 100.00%.
The proposed approach was implemented on a PC with an Intel® CoreTM i3-
3227U CPU running at 1.90 GHz and 4.00 GB RAM without parallel processing.
The bulk of the detection time was consumed by the convolutional neural network
as shown in Table 8.2.
8.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we evaluated the use of a relatively new machine learning technique,
the transfer learning of a Convolutional Neural Network, which in many computer
vision applications is providing the current state-of-the-art. We employed the widely
used pre-trained VGG-16 deep network as a feature extractor and an SVM for
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Table 8.1: Test results from four experimental designs: within-subject (top two)
or cross-subject design (bottom two), and including or not sharpened imposters in
the training set. In all cases, the test set contains both unprocessed and sharpened
imposters.
Within-subject validation design with images from all 21 individuals in the train-
ing set. We train with clients and unprocessed imposters only.
Labels client sharp0.0 sharp2.0 sharp4.0 sharp8.0 sharp16.0
Training set 788 788 -
Test set 262 each
Accuracy rate 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 98.09% 98.48%
Within-subject validation design with images from all 21 individuals in the train-
ing set. We train with clients, unprocessed imposters and sharpened imposters.
Labels client sharp0.0 sharp2.0 sharp4.0 sharp8.0 sharp16.0
Training set 750 4725 images (avg 788 each)
Test set 262 each
Accuracy rate 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Cross-subject validation design with images from 15 and 6 individuals for train-
ing and test, respectively. We train with clients and unprocessed imposters
only.
Labels client sharp0.0 sharp2.0 sharp4.0 sharp8.0 sharp16.0
Training set 750 750 -
Test set 300 each
Accuracy rate 90.91% 96.67% 93.00% 98.00% 86.33% 90.67%
Cross-subject validation design with images from 15 and 6 individuals for train-
ing and test, respectively. We train with clients, unprocessed imposters and
sharpened imposters.
Labels client sharp0.0 sharp2.0 sharp4.0 sharp8.0 sharp16.0
Training set 750 3750 images (750 each)
Test set 300 each
Accuracy rate 96.30% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
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Table 8.2: Timings.
Exp1: Within-subject validation: 1,576 images (2 labels). Test set: 1,572
VGG on training set VGG on test set SVM training and testing
∼15 hrs ∼15 hrs 32 secs
Exp2: Within-subject validation: 5,475 images (3 labels). Test set: 1,572
VGG on training set VGG on test set SVM training and testing
∼54 hrs ∼15 hrs 52 secs
Exp3: Cross-subject validation: 1,500 images (2 labels). Test set: 1,800
VGG on training set VGG on test set SVM training and testing
∼14.2 hrs ∼17.2 hrs 31 secs
Exp4: Cross-subject validation: 4,500 images (3 labels). Test set: 1,800
VGG on training set VGG on test set SVM training and testing
∼43.6 hrs ∼17.2 hrs 47 secs
the classification, aiming at detecting malicious spoofing attacks using processed
imposter images. The initial validation of the proposed approach shows that it
can be an extremely robust liveness detection technique, even in a cross-subject
validation setting. But in that case, training with sharpened imposters is required
in order to achieve the high accuracy rates that approach 100%.
In the future, we would like to extend the DURHAM FACE database with im-
poster images processed in various other ways beyond plain sharpening and use it to
fine tune a pre-trained Convolutional Neural Network. Further work on this direc-
tion will involve the augmentation of other publicly available databases with images
from processed imposter attacks.
In another direction for future work, we will utilize other CNN architectures for
transfer learning or for training classifiers from scratch. Examples of such archi-
tectures include AlexNet [99], GoogleNet [175] and ResNet [70]. The ResNet in
particular, consisting of 152 layer of conv-relu-conv series, is an example of the cur-
rent state-of-the-art very deep neural networks and we will consider adapting its
architecture for our purpose of detecting processed image imposter attacks.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
9.1 Introduction
Biometric security is the authentication of people's identity by an instant and auto-
matic verification mechanism using user's physical characteristics to provide them
with an access to the desired system. Nowadays, biometric security has become
one of the most, if not the most, robust verification method. The various biometric
traits can be either physiological or behavioural. Iris, fingerprint, face, and vein are
considered as the most usable physiological biometrics while behavioural biometrics
include activities such as gesturing, gait, and speech. Face recognition is a very
popular choice in security systems, and recently is considered the most common
identification system in commercial use.
Nevertheless, biometrics have been found to be vulnerable to malicious attacks.
These spoofing attempts can either be direct or indirect. Direct attacks occur at the
sensor level of the system, such attacks do not require any prior knowledge of the
structure of the system. On the other hand, indirect attacks require some knowledge
of the algorithmic methods employed the system.
Previous researches have shown that direct attacks can be deployed by using
printed photos, or by displaying videos or images of the biometric modality in-front
of the system's sensor. Our research focus on direct attacks to systems, and the
main contribution is that we studied such direct attacks on face recognition systems
assuming the use of processed imposter images.
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9.2 Research Contributions
The contributions of our research documented in this thesis are summarized as
follows:
1. Evaluating the Resilience of Commercial Face Recognition Systems
against Malicious Attacks.
In Chapter 4, we study the resilience of four widely used commercial face
recognition systems against various attacks using imposter images. Two ses-
sions were conducted for this experiment; the first session is studying whether
the images used in the attack can be user's ID photos, photos found on-line,
or any instant images taken on a mobile device. All of these four systems were
found vulnerable to our suggested very crude attacks. In the second session,
we studied the ability to gain access into the system by using photos of users
taken from different distances, aiming at finding out whether longer distances
between the face image and the sensor can result in less effective attacks to
the systems.
The second part of this contribution is to identify the image compression rate
threshold, which still allows successful attacks. In a final experiment, zooming
into the face when longer distance photos are used and then cropping the
image, was found partially successful as an attacking attempt.
The results of this contribution have been published in a paper entitled “Eval-
uating the Resilience of Face Recognition Systems Against Malicious Attacks”
[130]. This work was been of importance to other researchers to support the
motivation for their work by citing the fact that current commercial face recog-
nition systems have been found vulnerable to direct attacks, which can be as
basic as using highly compressed images, or images downloaded from on-line
sources or social media.
2. Resilience of Luminance based Liveness Tests under Attacks with
Processed Imposter Images
The main contribution of Chapter 5 is to evaluate the sensitivity of the live-
ness detection test presented by Tan et al. [177] against processed imposter
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image attacks. In a real life scenario, it is expected that the attackers would
consider processing the images to be used for spoofing attempts if they know
that would increase the effectiveness of the attacks. Thus, in this chapter,
we demonstrated that the accuracy rate of the liveness detection algorithm
proposed in [177] is affected by the use of processed imposter images. An
existed well-known face spoofing database, the NUAA which has client and
plain imposter datasets, was used to test the validity of our claim.
In our experiment, three main processing techniques were applied on a set of
images; the Gaussian blur, the addition of salt and pepper noise, and finally
the use of a sharpening filter. We showed that there is a considerable decrease
in the performance of the Tan et al. liveness detection algorithm when sharp-
ening the imposter images by various amounts. In particular, we showed that
higher amounts of sharpening lead to worse performance of the anti-spoofing
technique. In contrast, other image processing techniques such as blurring,
adding noise, or even blurring a sharpened image resulted in an increase of
the performance of the evaluated anti-spoofing method. The results of this
contribution have been published in a paper entitled “Resilience of luminance
based liveness tests under attacks with processed imposter images” [132].
3. Designing a Facial Spoofing Database for Processed Image Attacks
After a thorough research, we found that there is no face spoofing database
with processed imposter images. Hence, we decided to design a facial spoofing
database for processed imposter image attacks. This database has been de-
signed to include real live, recaptured photo images, and processed recaptured
photo images.
Designing such a database is a challenging task as there is a multitude of
parameters to consider. These parameters can include the type of the camera
to be used for capturing images, the illumination conditions during the photo-
shooting sessions, the camera focus mechanism, or the printer to be used for
producing imposters. In Chapter 6, we made an effort to understand these
challenging issues by conducted brief pilot studies, and produced a competitive
facial spoofing database. We tested this database on the Tan et al. liveness
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test and found that, as expected, the test was performing worse with processed
imposter images. The results of this contribution have been published in
a paper entitled “Designing a facial spoofing database for processed image
attacks” [131].
4. Signal-Noise Analysis of Face Anti-spoofing Algorithms
After conducting research on the robustness of our chosen liveness detection
algorithm, and found that the use of processed imposter images decreases its
performance, in Chapter 7 we go further into the detail modelling of how the
amount of sharpening affects performance. We modelled the outcomes of the
experiment using beta distributions for the signal and the noise, overcoming
certain limitations of the ROC curves.
5. Transfer Learning for Face Liveness Detection
Finally, in Chapter 8 we run initial anti-spoofing experiments using transfer
learning and Convolutional Neural Networks. Our first results verify that
processed image attacks are more difficult to detect even when using high-end
expensive machine learning techniques.
9.3 Limitations
1. Variation of the data
As noted in Chapter 6, creating a new comprehensive face database is not a
straightforward procedure, and a well designed plan is needed before start-
ing collecting data. This planning includes considering certain experimental
conditions and defining the parameters of the dataset. Due to the lack of ex-
perience, time, and human resources, we could not consider all such factors in
the creation of our database. As a result, the value of some parameters could
not be easily measured and qualified while others could not considered at all.
2. Size of the facial spoofing database
Deep learning has become the best performing machine learning techniques in
many applications. One limitation that prevents us from using deep neural
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networks in liveness tests is the lack of a very large face spoofing database.
This is a main challenge hindering further rapid progress in the face liveness
detection area.
9.4 Future Work
In the future, our plans are to consider the followings:
1. Extensions of the DURHAM FACE database
In the future, we aim at expanding the DURHAM FACE database to include
more types of processed imposter images, and if possible reverse engineer the
process of creating imposter images to make them look as close to the clients
as possible.
As we understand there is variety of face poses and expressions on social me-
dia, and other publicly available images and videos along with many different
parameters from resolution to depth of focus and we intend to use them to
inform the future of our database.
2. Evaluation methods
There are hundreds of anti-spoofing algorithms, especially regarding face recog-
nition. As it is impossible to consider all of these available methods, we aim
at considering the most well-known and most robust of them. At the machine
learning level, we aim at considering various feature extraction techniques and
several classifiers.
3. Liveness detection techniques
Our research highlighted the fact that even robust anti-spoofing algorithms are
still vulnerable to relatively simple attacks such as using processed imposter
images. In the future, we plan to work on developing stronger liveness tests
that are robust to any amended imposters. Our aim is that such liveness tests
will still not require any non-standard hardware such as the illuminated IR
sensor required by Windows Hello.
Appendix A
Evaluating the Resilience of
Commercial Face Recognition
Systems
This appendix contains the consent form and the questionnaire, which were filled
in by the participants for the experiment conducted to evaluate the resilience of
commercial face recognition systems against malicious attacks in Chapter 4.
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        Participant No:………… 
 
Dear Sir, Madam,  
Thank you for being a volunteering participant in my research study “Evaluating the 
resilience Face Recognition systems against malicious attacks”. This experiment 
aims to test the security of different face recognition systems for different machines. 
You will be part of this experiment by participating in verifying your face to different 
systems, then you’ll be taken an instant photo for your face through a mobile device, 
also you’ll be asked to offer any ID photo for yourself and finally to provide a link to 
some of published on internet/social media (Google, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, 
WhatsApp, etc.) photos for yourself. Those photos then will be used to gain access to 
our tested systems, then your photos will be resized several times to be used in the same 
experiment. While or after the experiment, kindly fill the attached form. 
 
There are no direct risks to you by participating in the study, if you find any 
inconvenience during the test you may withdraw at any time. If you have any questions, 
or would like a copy of the project outline, please contact Luma Omar 
(Luma.omar@durham.ac.uk). 
 
Best Regards, 
Luma Omar 
 
 
 
I have read the above document and I agree to participate in the study. 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ ____________________         ________________ 
 Participant’s Printed Name   Participant’s Signature        Date (dd/mm/yyyy)             
 
 
        Participant No:………… 
 
Evaluating the resilience Face Recognition systems against malicious attacks 
Gender: Male [   ] Female [   ] Age: _____ 
   
Your face has been verified to the systems Yes [   ] No [    ] 
Instant Photos by the mobile from different distances:-   
I. Instant Photos by the mobile from a close distance 
(approx 50 cm): 
  
 Your instant image was successful to gain access to at least 
one system: 
Yes [   ] No [    ] 
- If yes, then what system(s):   
 KeyLemon Yes [   ] No [    ] 
 Android Face Unlock Yes [   ] No [    ] 
 Windows 10 Yes [   ] No [    ] 
   
II. Instant Photos by the mobile from a medium distance 
(nearly 100 cm): 
  
 Your instant image was successful to gain access to at least 
one system 
Yes [   ] No [    ] 
- If yes, then what system(s):-   
 KeyLemon Yes [   ] No [    ] 
 Android Face Unlock Yes [   ] No [    ] 
 Windows 10 Yes [   ] No [    ] 
   
III. Instant Photos by the mobile from a medium distance 
(nearly 150 cm): 
  
 Your instant image was successful to gain access to at least 
one system 
Yes [   ] No [    ] 
- If yes, then what system(s):-   
 KeyLemon Yes [   ] No [    ] 
 Android Face Unlock Yes [   ] No [    ] 
 Windows 10 Yes [   ] No [    ] 
  
   
ID Photos:    
 Your ID photo was successful to gain access to at least one 
system 
Yes [   ] No [    ] 
- If yes, then what system(s):-   
 KeyLemon Yes [   ] No [    ] 
 Android Face Unlock Yes [   ] No [    ] 
 Windows 10 Yes [   ] No [    ] 
   
Photos on Internet/Social Media:   
 At least one of your Internet/Social Media ant image was 
successful to gain access to at least one system 
Yes [   ] No [    ] 
- If yes, then mention number of photos for each system:-   
 KeyLemon _____ out of _____    
 Android Face Unlock  _____ out of _____   
 Windows 10 _____ out of _____   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I thank you for your cooperation 
Luma Omar 
Appendix B
Durham Face Database
This appendix contains the summary and the consent form which have been given
to the participants for the creation of the Durham Face database in Chapter 6.
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Creating a face image database for liveness tests 
Lama Omar  
 
The aim is to create a digital database consisting of digital images of genuine faces and 
‘imposter digital images’, that is, digital images of genuine faces images printed on paper or 
displayed on a smartphone or tablet screen. In the Figure below you can see a typical 
example of a genuine face image and an imposter face image from the publicly available 
NUAA face image database for liveness tests.  
 
    
Real Imposter Real Imposter 
 
Figure: A typical example of a genuine face image (digital photo) and an imposter image 
(digital photo of a printout of the genuine face image) from the publicly available NUAA 
database for liveness tests.  
 
This database is expected to be used by me and other researchers on evaluating and further 
developing liveness tests, that is, algorithms aiming at distinguishing between genuine face 
images and imposter face images.  
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B.1 DF Database Creation Project Summary
        Participant No: ……… 
 
 
Dear participant,  
Thank you for being a participant in my research project “Creating a face image 
database for liveness tests”.  
In this photo-shooting session, which will last for a maximum of 15 minutes, several 
photos of your face will be taken. These photos, the corresponding imposter images, 
and processed versions of them will be part of the database. Please read the attached 
summary of the project for more information on how the database will be created.  
The face database will be publicly available for unrestricted access over the internet, 
but no information about your person (e.g. name, age, gender) will be attached to the 
images, or will become part of the database in any other way.  
There are no direct risks to you by participating in the study, if you find any 
inconvenience during the test you may withdraw at any time. If you have any 
questions, or would like a copy of the project outline, please contact Luma Omar 
(luma.omar@durham.ac.uk). 
At the end of the photo-shooting session, you will be given £5.00 as a thank you for 
participation.  
 
Thank you for your participation, 
Luma Omar 
 
 
 
I have read the documents and I agree to participate in the research. 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ ____________________         ________________ 
 Participant’s Printed Name   Participant’s Signature        Date (dd/mm/yyyy)             
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